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I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MICRODYNAMICS OF RACE 
Legal academics often perceive law and economics (L&E) and critical 
race theory (CRT) as oppositional discourses. Part of this has to do with the 
currency of the following caricatures: 
L&E is the methodological means by which conservative law 
professors advance their ideological interests. The approach is 
status-quo-oriented and indifferent (if not hostile) to the concerns 
of people of color and the poor. Because L&E is centered on 
notions of economic efficiency, it does not accommodate inquiries 
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into social justice and fairness. Because the models underlying 
L&E proposals are characterized by assumptions about rational 
actors and perfect markets, L&E policy prescriptions endorse 
market-based solutions to social problems and argue against 
government intervention. L&E scholarship is more concerned with 
protecting institutions from legal and governmental surveillance 
than with protecting people of color from racism. The political 
effect of L&E is to entrench and obfuscate racial and class 
hierarchies. 
CRT is the methodological means by which radical faculty of color 
(and especially black faculty) advance their ideological interests. 
The approach is invested in finding discrimination and 
characterizes even the most progressive institutional practices as 
racist. Much of this literature takes the form of storytelling, and 
almost all of this storytelling is bad. CRT scholars believe neither 
in merit nor in truth. For them, everything—including (and perhaps 
especially) scholarship—is and should be about race and politics. 
Central to CRT is the notion that racism is endemic to American 
society. Thus, CRT fails to take seriously notions of agency and 
social responsibility. CRT is, for example, more concerned with 
protecting criminals from punishment than with protecting society 
from crime. The models underlying CRT’s policy prescriptions are 
characterized by assumptions about racial actors and racial 
markets. Consequently, these proposals endorse governmental 
regulation of the market and argue against free-market 
mechanisms to ameliorate social problems. The political effect of 
CRT is preferential treatment and social welfare programs for 
people of color—particularly black people. 
It would be neither difficult nor interesting to disprove either caricature. 
Yet both have considerable intellectual and institutional purchase, so much 
so that they have helped to balkanize L&E and CRT scholarship. L&E and 
CRT scholars rarely pool their insights to work collaboratively. This was 
frustrating to the late David Charny, who felt that the inquiry into the racial 
dynamics of the modern workplace could benefit from combining insights 
from both fields.1 
Both sides are at fault. A deficiency on the L&E side is the failure of its 
proponents to conceptualize racial discrimination in the workplace as a 
dialectical process within which race both shapes, and is shaped by, 
workplace culture. For the most part, L&E scholars view race as an 
independent variable—something that is fixed, static, and easily 
 
1. For an indication of the extent to which our work builds on some of David’s insights, see 
generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at Work: Remembering David Charny, 
17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 13, 17-20 (2002). 
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measurable—and they pay little attention to the internal dynamics of the 
workplace as a determinant of race.2 L&E scholarship on discrimination has 
focused more on the market—a focus, which, as David saw it, obscured the 
fact that much discrimination was taking place in the workplace. Central to 
David’s thinking was the idea that in order to understand the operation of 
discrimination, one has to understand not only market forces as market 
forces, but also how those forces interact with the internal operation of the 
workplace. Workplaces are not structurally monolithic, and certain 
institutional arrangements within the workplace are more likely to produce 
problematic racial outcomes than others. For example, racial stereotypes 
may have different racial effects in a workplace where compensation is tied 
to output than in a workplace where compensation is based on peer or 
supervisor evaluations. 
Nor are workplace cultures static. Like the market, they change. They 
evolve in response to, among other things, changing commitments to, and 
conceptions of, race. If, for example, certain workplace structures are less 
conducive to the inclusion of racial minorities (and assuming that 
employers want diverse workforces), those structures likely will give way 
to institutional arrangements that are more conducive to integration. In turn, 
these institutional changes will shape how the employer and the employees 
understand race and practice racial interactions. Because L&E scholars 
largely treat race as preexisting and fixed, and because they focus more on 
markets than on workplaces, L&E scholarship does not reflect an 
understanding of the dialectic between racial identity and workplace 
culture. As we will show, understanding this relationship is critical to 
grappling with the complexities of contemporary workplace discrimination. 
On CRT’s side, the deficiency is twofold. First, while CRT is 
committed to the idea of race as a social construction—that is, the idea that 
race evolves as a function of historical, social, political, and economic 
contexts3—the literature has paid little attention to the workplace as a site 
of racial construction. In part, this is because much of CRT’s effort to 
combat racial discrimination in the workplace has focused on eliminating 
formal and informal racial barriers to entry. Given the particular history of 
race discrimination in America, this is not surprising. Blacks experienced 
the politics of racial segregation as a “closed door” to much of the labor 
market (and especially the professional labor market). Thus, civil rights 
efforts—in both practice and theory—focused on opening that door. There 
 
2. Laura Gómez makes a similar argument with respect to how early law-and-society scholars 
conceptualized race. See Laura E. Gómez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links 
Between Law & Society and Critical Race Theory, in A COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 
(Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming 2003). 
3. See generally Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations 
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
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was no need to think about the operation of race within professional 
workplaces because so few nonwhites had access to professional jobs. 
Things have changed. As a matter of formal law, blacks and other 
people of color are no longer barred from professional jobs. Evolving laws 
and social norms have opened the door, particularly for “qualified people of 
color.”4 How widely this door has opened is the subject of debate. But for 
present purposes, it is enough to observe that, over the past thirty years, 
changes in our laws and norms have increased the representation of people 
of color in professional workplaces. Central to our Review is the idea that 
the diversification of the professional workplace renders these workplaces 
important “social contexts” for thinking about racial formation—that is to 
say, the social construction of race. 
A second deficiency is that CRT articulates its conception of race as a 
social construction at the macro level, focusing primarily on legal and 
sociopolitical processes.5 It has not paid attention to the interpersonal ways 
in which race is produced.6 That is, CRT often ignores the racial 
productivity of the “choices” people of color make about how to present 
themselves as racialized persons.7 As a general matter, CRT’s race-as-a-
social-construction thesis does not include an analysis of the race-producing 
practices reflected in the daily negotiations people of color perform in an 
attempt to shape how (especially white) people interpret their nonwhite 
identities.8 For example, a Latina may decide not to speak Spanish at work, 
she may decide to “hold her tongue,” or she may refrain from socializing 
with other Latina workers.9 These are all race-constructing choices: How a 
 
4. We recognize that the term “qualified people of color” is problematic. It is often used to 
explain why people of color are underrepresented in professional jobs—they are not “qualified.” 
5. Laura E. Gómez, Race Mattered: Racial Formation and the Politics of Crime in Territorial 
New Mexico, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1395 (2002) (illustrating how racial formation and specific “racial 
projects” structured the legal, political, and social terrain of late nineteenth-century New Mexico); 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (explaining the role law 
played in the social construction of whiteness as property). 
6. Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002) 
(demonstrating the ways in which race is produced in the context of police interactions with 
nonwhite persons). 
7. “Choices” appears in quotation marks to convey the idea that we recognize that they are 
exercised under constraints. See generally Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern 
Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence 
Grossberg eds., 1988) (exploring whether and to what extent subordinated communities have 
agency “to speak”). We take our cue from Paulo Freire, who suggests that even the subordinated 
have some agency. See generally PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970). 
8. For an earlier and more complete articulation of this idea, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu 
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000). 
9. See JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE: BILINGUALISM AND THE POLITICS OF 
“ENGLISH ONLY” (1992); Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 321 (1987); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, 
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992). Significantly, the 
problem of race and language manifests itself not only with respect to different languages but also 
with respect to different accents. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, 
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Latina exercises them will inform how her employer and fellow employees 
experience her as a Latina. 
A CRT/L&E engagement helps to cure some of the deficiencies in both 
fields. For example, CRT’s notion of race as a social construction can help 
L&E scholars move to a dynamic conception of race, and L&E’s focus on 
the incentive effects of legal and institutional (norm-based) constraints can 
help CRT scholars analyze the ways in which the pressures and constraints 
of the workplace shape both employer and employee behavior. In short, a 
CRT/L&E joint venture could advance our thinking about how, in the 
shadow of law, workplace structures and norms affect racial identity—and 
vice versa. 
The argument for a collaboration between economics and CRT (and 
feminist theory and gay and lesbian legal studies) was made with force in a 
1996 essay by Ed Rubin.10 Rubin argued that the common critical approach 
to institutional analysis shared by L&E and CRT—both fields reject claims 
about the neutrality and objectivity of legal rules, albeit for different 
reasons—would, if combined, produce not only an exciting new 
methodology for legal inquiry, but one with potential to succeed the Legal 
Process school as a unifying discourse in legal academia. In the six years 
since the piece was published, however, there has been little collaborative 
work between CRT and L&E.11 If anything, there has been increased 
antagonism.12 
This makes little sense. Like Rubin, we believe that L&E and CRT 
should engage each other and that the results of this engagement would be 
fruitful. Rubin demonstrated the benefits of an L&E/CRT collaboration by 
 
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 
(1991). 
10. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) [hereinafter Rubin, New Legal 
Process]; see also Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 WIS. 
L. REV. 463 (book review); cf. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114 
(1987) (noting that, although CLS and L&E are often seen as oppositional, the link between them 
is quite close); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM 
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 157-70 (1997) (discussing CLS in their book on L&E and 
implying a close link between the fields). 
11. For an exception, see Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and 
Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 595, 629-34 (1999) (using theories of screening, adapted from financial 
economics, to examine English-only policies). 
12. Most of the antagonism takes the form of an unwillingness by members of either camp to 
engage each other. The most prominent and open attack on CRT (and critical theory generally) 
has come from two more mainstream or “traditional” legal academics, Daniel Farber and Suzanna 
Sherry. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997). The Farber and Sherry attack was preceded by 
one by Jeffrey Rosen (another legal scholar, but once again not an L&E one). Jeffrey Rosen, The 
Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27. The prominent L&E attack on CRT 
was Richard Posner’s review of the Farber and Sherry book. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40. 
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performing a meta-synthesis of the theoretical commitments and intellectual 
histories of both schools of thought.13 We take a different tack, identifying a 
specific problem that can function as a site for L&E/CRT collaboration. 
Articulated in the form of a question, the problem is this: How are modern 
employers and employees likely to “manage” workplace racial diversity? 
Part of the answer has to do with assimilation, a central theme in CRT; and 
part of the answer has to do with efficiency, a central theme in L&E. Both 
ideas—assimilation and efficiency—combine to tell a story about 
workplace discrimination that derives from what we call “the homogeneity 
incentive.” To make a long story short: In order to increase efficiency, 
employers have incentives to screen prospective employees for 
homogeneity, and, in order to counter racial stereotypes, nonwhite 
employees have incentives to demonstrate a willingness and capacity to 
assimilate. 
Central to our story is the idea that, due to evolving antidiscrimination 
law and changing social norms concerning equality, an employer’s response 
to the homogeneity incentive will include some diversity hiring. We 
assume, in other words, that exclusively white institutions are perceived as 
illegitimate, even if those institutions have not engaged (or, at least, there is 
no evidence to suggest that they have engaged) in intentional racial 
discrimination. We conceptualize this legitimacy problem as a diversity-
imposed constraint—that is, as a limit on an employer’s ability to realize 
the efficiency gains from homogeneity by hiring only whites. We claim 
that, notwithstanding this constraint, gaps in both antidiscrimination law 
and current societal conceptions of racial discrimination allow employers to 
make race-based employment decisions. Put another way, under current 
antidiscrimination law and the dominant paradigms for understanding 
racism, it is both legal and normatively desirable for employers to pursue 
workplace homogeneity by engaging in racial discrimination. 
Our point of departure for developing this argument is the recent 
publication of a collection of essays entitled Crossroads, Directions, and a 
New Critical Race Theory.14 The majority of the essays in this volume were 
delivered at the last major CRT conference, which was held at Yale in 
1997. Selected by Frank Valdes, Jerome Culp, and Angela Harris, the 
 
13. Although Rubin does not use it, the methodology he proposes for the CRT/L&E joint 
venture is microanalysis. See generally Rubin, New Legal Process, supra note 10. Rubin’s other 
work suggests that the type of microanalysis in which he would have the collaborative venture 
engage would be based on a detailed and experiential examination of interpersonal workplace 
dynamics. See Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and 
Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705 (1998). 
14. CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et 
al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY]. 
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essays represent the past, present, and future of CRT.15 The book is a must-
read for those who are interested in the genesis of CRT, in how CRT 
positions itself against other legal discourses, and in the current debates 
within the CRT literature. Of most interest to us are the “new” and 
“directions” aspects of the collection. While there are new ideas in the book 
(for example, the notion of racism as a form of sadomasochistic pleasure 
for both whites and blacks16), and the essays do take CRT in new directions 
(for example, to an explicit engagement of globalization17), the 
methodologies reflected in the essays—postmodern theory, deconstruction, 
and narrative—are, for the most part, not new. Except for a contribution by 
Elizabeth Iglesias, which demonstrates the international racial effects of 
neoliberal economics,18 there is little indication in A New Critical Race 
Theory that critical race theorists are interested in using different tools, like 
statistical analysis, traditional economics, or behavioral law and economics. 
Nonetheless, there are new developments in economics that support at 
least some of CRT’s central tenets. Early iterations of L&E argued that 
because discrimination is inefficient, market forces would penalize those 
who engaged in it. Under that view, there is no need for legal intervention 
because the market can both identify and clear discrimination.19 CRT has 
been skeptical of this claim, in part because the employment market 
continues to be characterized by stark racial outcomes.20 Significantly, 
some L&E scholars have become skeptical of this claim as well. They 
argue that economic models stressing the market’s antidiscrimination 
potential are often overly simplistic and based on unrealistic assumptions 
about the behavior of individuals, institutions, and markets.21 To complicate 
 
15. The fact that the essays arose out of a conference, and that the conference took place in 
1997, limits the representative capacity of the book. 
16. Anthony Paul Farley, The Poetics of Colorlined Space, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, supra note 14, at 97.  
17. Celina Romany, Critical Race Theory in Global Context, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, supra note 14, at 303; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces, and the 
Role of Critical Race Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An 
Institutional Class Analysis, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 310; Isabelle 
R. Gunning, Global Feminism at the Local Level: The Criminalization of Female Genital 
Surgeries, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 337; Berta Esperanza 
Hernández-Truyol, Breaking Cycles of Inequality: Critical Theory, Human Rights, and Family 
In/justice, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 345; Enrique R. Carrasco, 
Critical Race Theory and Post-Colonial Development: Radically Monitoring the World Bank and 
the IMF, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 366. 
18. Iglesias, supra note 17. 
19. For a recent description of, and empirical challenge to, this literature, see Michael Selmi, 
The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation 
and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003).  
20. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of 
Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993) (book review). 
21. Among the earliest pieces in this vein was Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and 
Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1003, 1033-82 (1995). See also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 133-47 (2000).  
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the picture, many current generation L&E scholars engage literatures in 
organizational behavior, psychology, management, sociology, and biology 
to illustrate problems of cognition, asymmetric information, and market 
failure. This broader interdisciplinary approach is intended to provide a 
more contextual (and less stylized) picture of people and institutions. More 
particularly, the approach attempts to capture how people and institutions 
really act and to identify what motivates people and institutions to act in the 
way that they do. With respect to employers, the approach suggests that 
race-based employment decisions will not necessarily be motivated by 
racial animus but by an employer’s interest in realizing the efficiency gains 
of homogeneity. To the extent that this is the case, employers will racially 
integrate their workplaces only to the extent that doing so does not 
significantly undermine their ability to realize those efficiency gains.  
This observation helps legitimize CRT’s concept of interest 
convergence—the idea that nonwhites achieve meaningful progress in 
America only to the extent that a particular nonwhite interest (for example, 
ending slavery) converges with an important white interest (for example, 
saving the Union).22 With respect to workplace discrimination, the interest 
convergence story holds that the state will require employers to hire 
nonwhites only when doing so converges with the institutional interests of 
the employer. This occurs when diversity hiring provides the employer with 
institutional legitimacy without compromising the efficiency gains 
attendant to homogeneous workplace cultures. 
There is an irony in the suggestion that a “new” direction for CRT 
scholarship to take may be to construct second-generation L&E models that 
look for insights and evidence in fields like psychology and organizational 
behavior. One of the classic pieces of interdisciplinary scholarship on the 
operation of unconscious racism is Charles Lawrence’s The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.23 The article 
has a foundational status in CRT’s canon,24 and Lawrence is considered a 
 
22. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 45 (1972). Bell argues 
that “the major liberating events in black history have, in fact, been motivated less by black 
suffering than by the pragmatic advantage they offered white society.” Id. Bell explains the idea 
of interest convergence by way of the following two formulas: White Racism v. Justice = White 
Racism. White Racism v. White Self-Interest = Justice. Id. at 46; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 
(1980) (explaining Brown in terms of interest convergence); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as 
a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988) (examining various historical documents to 
demonstrate that interest convergence—specifically, concerns about American democracy 
abroad—provides at least a partial explanation for Brown). 
23. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
24. It is one of the articles that helped “form the movement.” See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 235 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) 
(reprinting an edited version of Lawrence’s article). 
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“founding member”25 of the movement. Both facts help to explain why 
Lawrence was invited to deliver the opening remarks at the Yale conference 
and why those comments open A New Critical Race Theory. And yet, with 
few exceptions, critical race theorists have not pushed CRT further in the 
direction suggested by Lawrence’s article.26 To be sure, the article is well 
cited in the literature.27 But Lawrence’s approach has not been significantly 
developed. This Review begins a dialogue about how one might do so. We 
proceed as follows. 
Rather than forming the core of a traditional “Book Review,” Part II 
engages A New Critical Race Theory in order to identify and explain the 
key concepts in CRT that help to elucidate the complex ways in which race 
operates in workplaces: race as social construction, race as performative 
identity, essentialism, identity privilege, multiracialism, and narrative. We 
suggest that while each of these concepts is important, none provides (or at 
least CRT scholars have not enlisted any of them to provide) a 
structural/institutional critique of the workplace. We argue that one can 
perform such a critique by turning to literatures to which economists have 
begun to look—literatures suggesting that efficiency concerns (and not 
necessarily racial animosity) create incentives for employers to maintain 
racially homogeneous workplaces. We refer to these incentives collectively 
as “the homogeneity incentive,” and in Part III, we articulate the precise 
nature of this incentive and employ it as a basis for the institutional 
discrimination story we develop in Part IV. Central to this story is the fact 
that employers respond to the homogeneity incentive by using a variety of 
selection mechanisms to pick the most racially homogenized outsiders—
that is, outsiders whose performance of their racial identity suggests that 
they will fit comfortably within a workplace that is homogenized by the 
overwhelming presence of insiders. Drawing on CRT, we articulate the 
racial costs of these mechanisms. In Part V, we raise the question of 
 
25. Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 898 
n.16. 
26. An exception is JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 14, 72-77, 154-55 (1997). In legal academia more 
broadly, there are a number of scholars who have pushed in the direction of Lawrence’s piece. 
See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social 
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal 
Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001); 
Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify 
Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between “Different” Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
313, 338-39 (2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); 
Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes,” 55 VAND. 
L. REV. 481 (2002). None of these articles, however, links its examination of cognitive biases and 
other psychological processes to the internal dynamics of the workplace. 
27. A search run in Westlaw’s JLR database on December 3, 2002, yielded 1117 articles that 
cite Lawrence’s piece. A search run in Social Science Citation Index through Web of Science on 
December 3, 2002, yielded 466 articles that cite Lawrence’s piece. 
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whether antidiscrimination law can identify and ameliorate these costs. We 
conclude in Part VI by highlighting two macro implications of our 
argument. The first is that, in effect, the homogeneity incentive creates a 
market for the demand and the supply of racial palatability. It is a market 
within which racial identities are being mass-produced and cloned—one 
body at a time.28 The second implication is that law—by creating incentives 
for employee behavior—is part of the cloning apparatus. More specifically, 
we claim, in the course of adjudicating antidiscrimination cases, the law 
constructs prototypical racial victims (assimilationist outsiders) who 
function as models for how outsiders should perform their racial identities 
in order to be able to present cognizable discrimination claims. We 
conclude by suggesting that CRT should be interested in this incentive 
structure because it helps to demonstrate the racially productive capacity of 
law.29 
II. CENTRAL THEMES IN CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
The essays in A New Critical Race Theory span a vast range of both 
subjects and disciplines, going from Julie Su and Eric Yamamoto’s 
discussion of activist and grass-roots work with Thai garment workers in 
California sweatshops30 to Patricia Monture-Angus’s story of a tenure 
denial at a university in northern Canada.31 What the essays have in 
common is that they all purport to be doing CRT. That raises the 
definitional question: What is CRT? Put another way, how do we know that 
these essays actually do CRT? Part of the answer lies in the anthology’s 
introduction. There, its editors describe CRT by articulating CRT’s 
opposition to “at least three entrenched, mainstream beliefs about racial 
injustice. The first—and still the most powerful despite more than a decade 
of challenge from critical scholars—is that ‘blindness’ to race will eliminate 
racism.”32 The second is “that racism is a matter of individuals, not 
 
28. See generally Philomena Essed & David Theo Goldberg, Cloning Cultures: The Social 
Injustices of Sameness, 25 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1066 (2002) (exploring the ways in which 
society is organized to reproduce sameness, and identifying the discriminatory distributive 
consequences of that reproduction). We do not mean to suggest that only outsider identities are 
being produced. Law creates incentives that affect both insider and outsider behavior. In this 
sense, insider identities are being mass-produced as well.  
29. One of the central ideas of CRT is that law not only reflects particular conceptions of 
race, but produces race as well. See generally Carbado, supra note 6 (demonstrating the racial 
productivity of Fourth Amendment law). 
30. Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in A NEW 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 379.  
31. Patricia Monture-Angus, On Being Homeless: One Aboriginal Woman’s “Conquest” of 
Canadian Universities, 1989-98, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 274. 
32. Francisco Valdes et al., Battles Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical Race Theory at the Turn 
of the Millennium, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 1, 1. 
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systems.”33 And the third is “that one can fight racism without paying 
attention to sexism, homophobia, economic exploitation, and other forms of 
oppression or injustice.”34 One can think of these “three oppositional 
stances”35 as minimal commitments, commitments that every CRT project 
reflects. According to the editors, these commitments “give . . . CRT much 
of its discursive edge and transformative potential.”36 
Yet the “transformative potential” of CRT’s oppositional stances might 
not be apparent from A New Critical Race Theory’s introduction. The 
editors do not explicate this potential, presumably because their project is to 
introduce us to works that do.37 But the works that constitute the anthology 
are enormously different in style, subject matter, and methodology. While 
this is a plus—reflecting what Kimberlé Crenshaw refers to as CRT’s “big 
tent”38 approach, and providing an indication of the extent to which CRT 
can speak across and to a range of issues—such a broad-ranging approach 
makes CRT appear to be substantively and theoretically diffuse and, as 
Rachel Moran puts it, “unruly.”39 In short, the disparate body of work that 
occupies space in CRT’s tent renders CRT difficult to manage and 
articulate as a positive theory.40 
Part of the reason for the size of CRT’s tent, and the room it has created 
for diverse approaches, is that CRT is not just a constellation of ideas. It is 
also a community, a safe space, and a platform from which to engage in 
 
33. Id. at 1-2. 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. For other articulations of what CRT is, see the introductions in CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 24, at xiii, and 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, at xiii (Richard Delgado ed., 1995). 
37. They write that the “three oppositional stances . . . are embraced and advanced by the 
works collected here.” Valdes et al., supra note 32, at 2. 
38. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the 
Closing Door,” in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 9, 20. Here, Crenshaw 
provides an indication as to why the term CRT was chosen. A determination was made to “signify 
the specific . . . and intellectual location of the project through ‘critical,’ the substantive focus 
through ‘race,’ and the desire to develop a coherent account of race and law through the term 
‘theory.’” Id. at 19. 
39. Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2003). 
40. John Calmore explains: 
Critical race theory has become sort of a moving target, as it and scholarly allies 
change various landscapes. This scholarship is now quite broad-based. As it has 
evolved, it has attracted a motley crew, and its body of scholarship is actually 
improvisationally incoherent, diffuse, and stunningly eclectic in both method and 
message. Critical race theory primarily investigates how the law contributes to and 
diminishes racial subordination. Beyond that, it is harder to identify and, like rain, its 
fallout varies in impact. 
John O. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior—Part 2: A Critical Response to the 
Hegemonic “Truth” of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1589, 1592 (1999) 
(footnote omitted). 
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racial struggle.41 Historically, critical race theorists have thus been careful 
about creating insider/outsider dynamics.42 While our view is not that CRT 
needs to be disciplined, or that critical race theorists need to police CRT’s 
intellectual border rigorously, we agree with Chuck Lawrence that “it 
is . . . important . . . to define clearly who we [critical race theorists] are and 
what we stand for.”43 The editors of A New Critical Race Theory attempt to 
do so by bringing together a range of ideas from a number of different 
contexts. We build on that synthesis to provide a more situated indication of 
the “transformative potential” of CRT. Concretely, our examination of A 
New Critical Race Theory is geared towards answering the question of 
whether the essays in the collection can be employed to broaden our 
understanding of a specific problem of racial inequality: workplace 
discrimination. We answer that question in the affirmative by using the 
essays in A New Critical Race Theory to draw out key ideas in CRT. We 
then apply these ideas to the workplace. 
The constraints of space and our substantive focus prevent us from 
engaging all of the essays, though we engage most. For example, we do not 
discuss the globalization section of the book.44 This is not because 
globalization is irrelevant to understanding the racial dynamics of the 
workplace. Among other things, globalization affects both the structure and 
demographics of employment markets—abroad and at home. But except for 
Elizabeth Iglesias’s contribution,45 the globalization section of the 
anthology does not discuss these aspects of globalization. Instead, it 
addresses how CRT might respond to such important and complicated 
 
41. Kimberlé Crenshaw notes that, from its inception, CRT has had to negotiate concerns 
about safe space with concerns about substantive political vision. She writes: 
[T]he organizational goal of “safe space” served as the provisional justification for the 
initial inclusion of people of color only. One might frame the issue as safe-space values 
having trumped substantive content: Identity rather than substantive criteria won out as 
a defining factor in determining participation in the workshop. However, this, too, 
could be reframed as competing substantive perspectives. Was CRT a product of 
people of color, or was CRT a product of any scholar engaged in a critical reflection of 
race? Because I subscribe to the latter proposition, I regard the traditional exclusion of 
whites from our workshops as an unfortunate development. 
Crenshaw, supra note 38, at 21. 
42. Concerns about insider/outsider dynamics provide at least a partial explanation for the 
emergence of “Latcrit Theory.” For an introduction to Latcrit Theory as well as a discussion of 
some of the challenges facing Latcrit, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, LatCrit at 
Five: Institutionalizing a Post-Subordination Future, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1249 (2001). 
43. Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Who Are We? And Why Are We Here? Doing 
Critical Race Theory in Hard Times, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at xi, 
xvii. 
44. See sources cited supra note 17. 
45. Iglesias, supra note 17.  
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topics as female genital surgeries;46 race, gender, and human rights;47 and 
postcolonial developments.48 
Caveats out of the way, we now discuss the following central, though 
not exhaustive, concepts in CRT: race as social construction, race as a 
performative identity, essentialism, identity privilege, multiracialism, and 
narrative. In addition to articulating the ideas behind each concept, we 
discuss how these concepts can help us better understand racial dynamics in 
the workplace. 
A. Race as Social Construction 
Robert Chang observes that the articulation of race as a social 
construction is “a mantra”49 in CRT. “[F]or fun,” Professor Chang 
sometimes has his “students say it out loud . . . . Nothing happens. They are 
not enlightened, and the world has not changed . . . . So why the mantra?”50 
CRT’s answer is that the conceptualization of race as a social construction 
helps to explain not only the intelligibility and currency of race as a social 
category (that is, the existence of race) but also the negative and positive 
social meanings associated with specific racial identities (that is, the 
existence of racial hierarchy). Several of the essays in A New Critical Race 
Theory illustrate this point. 
Consider Robert Hayman and Nancy Levit’s contribution to the 
volume.51 Their essay performs a periodizational analysis of the social 
construction of race to advance the claim that race was never simply “out 
there” to be identified and discovered. Rather, they argue, race was 
invented “in a quite literal sense.”52 Their analysis begins in the seventeenth 
century, between 1619 and 1662. They argue that, during this period, the 
idea of race had not yet crystallized. While European colonists were 
mindful of bodily differences between themselves and Africans, those 
differences were not a basis for the establishment of a social hierarchy. 
Instead, “whatever ‘race’-ism may have characterized the early colonies 
was vague, incomplete, and far from universal.”53 We are somewhat 
skeptical of the claim that the colonists saw bodily differences between 
themselves and the Africans as differences without social or hierarchical 
 
46. Gunning, supra note 17.  
47. Hernández-Truyol, supra note 17. 
48. Carrasco, supra note 17. 
49. Robert S. Chang, Critiquing “Race” and Its Uses: Critical Race Theory’s Uncompleted 
Argument, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 87, 87. 
50. Id. at 87-88.  
51. Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, Un-natural Things: Constructions of Race, 
Gender, and Disability, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 159. 
52. Id. at 162. 
53. Id. at 163. 
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significance. At the very least, Europeans perceived Africans to be 
primitive.54 Nor are we convinced that the concept of race did not exist 
before this period. One can argue that many of the clashes between 
ethnically different groups in China, Egypt, and India—among other 
regions—were informed by what we would today articulate as racial 
discourses.55 Still, the general point that Hayman and Levit make—that race 
evolved and that that evolution was a function of societal needs, politics, 
and economics—is well-taken.56 
According to Hayman and Levit, between 1662 and 1776, the idea of 
race—an idea that developed to require both racial categorization and racial 
hierarchy—was instantiated. During this period, a variety of discourses 
articulated the African/European differences as differences in worth and 
entitlement. It is in this context that “[r]ace emerged . . . as a determinant of 
legal status . . . . [T]he ‘negro’ was a slave and the ‘white’ person was 
free.”57 Between 1776 and 1835, the material realities of race were further 
entrenched by political rationalization. Hayman and Levit reason that this 
rationalization was needed “to resolve the contradiction between the 
ideology of the revolutionary generation and the fact of chattel slavery.”58 
The final period Hayman and Levit identify is “1835-?”, presumably 
suggesting that we are still in this period. Here, politicians, academics, and 
scientists enlisted the rhetoric of science, and the results of “scientific 
studies,” to prove the “truths” about race.59 
Hayman and Levit’s essay demonstrates that race does not exist a 
priori, but is instead produced by discourses. These discourses—in politics, 
law, and science—create, give meaning to, and organize race.60 And this 
process of racial formation is unstable. The definition of race has changed, 
the list of racial categories has changed, and the social meaning of specific 
racial identities has changed. Race thus is, and historically has been, 
mutable61—or, to put the point in slightly different terms, race did not have 
to exist,62 and it certainly did not have to exist in the forms it has 
throughout American history. 
 
54. DENYS W.T. SHROPSHIRE, THE CHURCH AND PRIMITIVE PEOPLES, at xiii (1938). 
55. See Norah Carlin, Was There Racism in Ancient Society?, 36 INT’L SOCIALISM 90 (1987). 
56. The standard citation is to MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994). 
57. Hayman & Levit, supra note 51, at 163. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 164. For a discussion of how the concept of race is deployed in science, see THE 
CONCEPT OF “RACE” IN NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997). 
60. See Carbado, supra note 6, at 978. 
61. Devon W. Carbado, Afterword: (E)Racing Education, 35 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 
181, 184 (2002). 
62. This observation has led some left-leaning scholars to be “against race.” See, e.g., PAUL 
GILROY, AGAINST RACE (2000). For a critique of this argument as it is manifested in the work of 
legal academics, see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness? Individual Identity, 
Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455 (2002). 
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CRT can broaden its understanding of race as a social construction by 
considering the workplace as a context within which race evolves and is 
produced. A simple way of thinking about the racial productivity of the 
workplace is to examine how workplace racial demographics—which 
evolve over time—help convey various social meanings about race. In the 
context of Jim Crow, blacks were barred from certain workplaces and 
professions. The image of race that context produces (that blacks are too 
inferior to associate with whites at work) is not the same as the social 
meaning of race conveyed by a workplace within which blacks are present 
only as support staff (which conveys the notion that blacks are competent 
only at low-level service work). Finally, neither of those workplaces 
conveys the same social meaning about race as a workplace with black 
professionals but not black managers, directors, or partners (sending the 
signal that blacks can sometimes perform professional work but can rarely 
provide professional leadership). This suggests that employees do not come 
to the workplace racially formed in a once-and-for-all sense. Their racial 
identities will shape, and be shaped by, the racial culture and demographics 
of, and their institutional position within, the workplace. In sum, 
workplaces do not exist outside the social construction of race: They are 
part of it.  
B. Race as a Performative Identity 
A concrete application of the concept of race as a social construct is the 
idea of race as a performative identity. The claim is that the social meaning 
of, for example, a black person’s racial identity is a function of the way in 
which that person performs (presents) her blackness.63 At the core of this 
conception is the notion that race is not just a structural or macro dynamic. 
It is a micro and interpersonal dynamic as well; racial identities are formed 
in, and produced by, social encounters. In the context of everyday 
interactions, people construct—that is, they project and interpret particular 
images of—race. This means that the intelligibility of a black person’s 
racial identity derives at least in part from (1) the “picture” of blackness she 
projects and (2) how that racial projection is seen. This implies that there is 
more than one way to be, and be interpreted as, black. Blackness, in other 
words, is not monolithic. 
On one side of the spectrum are “conventional” black people. They are 
black prototypes—that is, people who are perceived to be stereotypically 
 
63. We develop this idea more fully in Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8. Cf. ERVING 
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 77 (1959) (“[O]ne finds that service 
personnel, whether in profession, bureaucracy, business, or craft, enliven their manner with 
movements which express proficiency and integrity, but, whatever this manner conveys about 
them, often its major purpose is to establish a favorable definition of their service or product.”). 
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black. Their performance of blackness is consistent with society’s 
understanding of who black people really are. On the other side are 
“unconventional” black people—people who are not stereotypically black. 
Their performance of blackness is outside of what society perceives to be 
conventional black behavior. A black person’s vulnerability to 
discrimination is shaped in part by her racial position on this spectrum. The 
less stereotypically black she is, the more palatable her identity is. The 
more palatable her identity is, the less vulnerable she is to discrimination. 
The relationship among black unconventionality, racial palatability, and 
vulnerability to discrimination creates an incentive for black people to 
signal—through identity performances—that they are unconventionally 
black.64 These signals convey the idea that the sender is black in a 
phenotypic but not a social sense. Put another way, the signals function as a 
marketing device. They brand the black person so as to make clear that she 
is not a black prototype.65 
The concept of race as performative suggests that people of color are 
not simply acted on. They have some agency to structure the terms upon 
which they are experienced.66 For example, how a law firm treats a black 
woman may depend on whether her hair is straightened, “natural” and 
short, Afroed, or dreaded. In other words, the choices a black woman makes 
about how to groom her hair will inform how their employers racialize her. 
But how? “Hair seems to be such a little thing.”67 Paulette Caldwell has 
provided a wonderful articulation of the racializing potential of black 
women’s hair.68 Her article on the subject begins this way: 
I want to know my hair again, to own it, to delight in it again, to 
recall my earliest mirrored reflection when there was no beginning 
and I first knew that the person who laughed at me and cried with 
me and stuck out her tongue at me was me. I want to know my hair 
again, the way I knew it before I knew that my hair is me, before I 
lost the right to me, before I knew that the burden of beauty—or 
lack of it—for an entire race of people could be tied up with my 
hair and me. 
I want to know my hair again, the way I knew it before I knew 
Sambo and Dick, Buckwheat and Jane, Prissy and Miz Scarlett. 
 
64. For a discussion of how this concept of identity performance differs from Judith Butler’s 
conception of the performativity of gender, see Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8, at 1265 n.11. 
65. One could also say that the black person is “unbranded” as a black prototype. 
66. For a useful discussion of the problematic ways in which the law has responded to the 
agency of subordinated groups, see Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist 
Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999); and Kathryn Abrams, Sex 
Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). 
67. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 370. 
68. Id.  
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Before I knew that my hair could be wrong—the wrong color, the 
wrong texture, the wrong amount of curl or straight. Before hot 
combs and thick grease and smelly-burning lye, all guaranteed to 
transform me, to silken the coarse, resistant wool that represents 
me.69 
Caldwell’s quotation suggests that hair is racially representative: It 
brands. A black woman can be perceived as “silken” or “coarse” or 
“resistant” depending on what she does with her hair, a signifier of her 
racial identity. Caldwell herself discusses how her colleagues differentially 
racialize her—quite literally from day to day—based on her hair.70 To 
some, this observation may suggest that black women have agency to 
mitigate their vulnerability to discrimination by making “better” choices 
about, among other aspects of their identity, their hair. Recognizing that this 
agency exists is important. It is a necessary condition for understanding that 
people can shape how others racialize them. The normative and more 
difficult issue, however, is whether an employer should be able to condition 
a black woman’s employment opportunities on her willingness to present 
herself (“my hair and me”) as a straight-haired black woman. Asked 
differently, should employers be permitted to clone blackness in this way?  
The essay in A New Critical Race Theory that tackles racial 
presentation and performance is Anthony Farley’s discussion of the 
objectification of the black body by white society.71 Although Farley only 
once employs the language of performance, his argument is about the 
choices people make about how to be raced. His thesis is this: “Race is a 
form of pleasure. For whites, it is a sadistic pleasure in decorating black 
bodies with disdain. For blacks—in today’s non-revolutionary situation—it 
has become a masochistic pleasure in being so decorated.”72 
Fundamental to Farley’s claim, then, is that while whites and blacks are 
not similarly situated with respect to the color line,73 both groups derive 
pleasure from the sociopolitical processes that constitute it. Farley spends 
considerable time explaining why whites would be invested in employing 
the black body as a “fetish object,” but little explaining why blacks would 
make themselves available for, and derive pleasure from, racial 
objectification. One might posit that the answer is constraint—black agency 
is so constrained as to make participation inexorable. Farley’s answer 
seems to be seduction—the seduction of a colorblind future or of a 
 
69. Id. at 365. 
70. Id. at 370-71. 
71. Farley, supra note 16, at 97, 99. 
72. Id. 
73. See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES 
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968). 
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depoliticized understanding of Martin Luther King’s dream.74 Farley is 
critical of this seduction and conceptualizes it as a performance that 
acquiesces in, reproduces, and legitimizes racial hierarchy. He writes: 
The black body is a vast writing project. It is a twice-haunted, 
twice-scripted body. The good Negro and the bad Negro are 
animating spirits that emerge, like the Madonna and the Whore, 
depending on the performance desired. White pre-Civil Rights 
Movement desire for abject black bodies required, at times, the 
good Negro of minstrelsy and, at other times, the bad Negro of 
lynchings. Pity and contempt were the twin emotions that 
accompanied the race pleasure rituals . . . .75 
Farley’s suggestion seems to be that the racial quality of black identity 
performances (the good negro versus the bad negro) makes the color line 
more or less a pleasurable thing for whites—and for blacks. 
The concept of race as performative provides a vehicle for thinking 
about how race figures in employment decisions that are not driven by 
explicit racial animus. The question here is: Do employers look for racially 
performative evidence—that is, evidence not simply of whether a 
prospective employee is, for example, Asian American, but also evidence 
of how Asian American (or Asian American) the person appears to be? If 
the answer is yes—that employers do indeed look for racially performative 
evidence—how is that likely to influence the behavior of Asian American 
employees seeking a job with that employer? Further, assuming that an 
Asian American employee decides to alter the performance of identity so 
that, from her employer’s perspective, she appears to be Asian American 
only in phenotype, what are the costs of that performance? These questions 
are not easy to answer. But the important thing, for purposes of this 
Review, is that a performative conception of race invites us to ask them and 
to engage in an explicit discussion of incentives, choices, constraints, and 
costs—in others words, an economic analysis. 
C. Essentialism 
To essentialize about race is to assume that a particular racial identity 
has a certain essence. An example helps illustrate how essentialism can 
undermine our ability to identify and ameliorate workplace discrimination. 
 
74. For a discussion of the extent to which conservatives have appropriated and deradicalized 
the politics of Martin Luther King, see Ronald Turner, The Dangers of Misappropriation: 
Misusing Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Legacy To Prove the Colorblind Thesis, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
101 (1996). For an example, see TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE 
FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1997). 
75. Farley, supra note 71, at 119 (emphasis added). 
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Imagine that a firm interviews three people for a job—a white woman, a 
black woman, and a black man. It hires the white woman and the black 
man, but not the black woman. She brings a discrimination suit. Due to 
prevailing essentialist notions, it used to be that the black woman’s chances 
of winning this suit were slim. Courts approached such cases from a “single 
axis” framework, looking for racism (which they concluded was not present 
because a black man was hired) or sexism (which they concluded was not 
present because a white woman was hired).76 Courts rarely considered the 
possibility that racism and sexism interact—that is, that racism is sexed and 
that sexism is racialized. Instead, they essentialized racism, assuming that, 
if racism exists, it affects black women and black men in the same way, and 
they essentialized sexism, assuming that, if sexism exists, it affects black 
women and white women in the same way.77 
CRT rejects this essentialized approach to discrimination and is 
committed to what Kimberlé Crenshaw refers to as intersectionality, a 
concept that conveys at least the following two ideas: (1) that our identities 
are intersectional—that is, raced, gendered, sexually oriented, etc.—and (2) 
that our vulnerability to discrimination is a function of our specific 
intersectional identities.78 Because black men and black women have 
different intersectional identities, the nature of their vulnerability to, and 
their experiences of, discrimination are likely to be different as well. On the 
other side, CRT also embraces essentialism in asserting that there is 
something different and special about race. To take anti-essentialism to its 
logical conclusion would mean rejecting the concept of race altogether,79 
which is something that CRT avowedly does not do.80 This tension is the 
basis of the debate between Catharine MacKinnon and Angela Harris, a 
debate that enters A New Critical Race Theory through MacKinnon’s 
contribution.81 
 
76. The best articulation of this problem remains Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. 
77. Today, at least some courts recognize so-called “compound” discrimination claims—i.e., 
claims based on more than one aspect of a person’s identity (such as race and sex). See Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 710-14 
(2001) (discussing how courts have responded to the idea of intersectionality). 
78. See id. 
79. This is precisely the postmodern position on race (or at least one postmodern position on 
race)—that the category race be jettisoned. For a useful discussion of how CRT straddles the line 
between postmodernism and modernism, see Angela Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 
82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994).  
80. Gayatri Spivak famously coined the phrase “strategic essentialism” to explain the need 
for racial minorities to essentialize in order to fight discrimination (and, in some sense, 
essentialism itself). GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography, in IN OTHER WORLDS 197 (1988); see also Gayatri Spivak, In a Word, 
DIFFERENCES, Summer 1989, at 124 (interview). 
81. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Keeping It Real: On Anti-“Essentialism,” in A NEW CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 71.  
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MacKinnon is not convinced that CRT’s anti-essentialist critique of 
feminism is accurate. Her analysis focuses on Angela Harris’s 1990 article, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory.82 Focusing on 
essentialism vis-à-vis women, Harris defined essentialism as “the notion 
that a unitary ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described 
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of 
experience.”83 She argued that this idea is manifested—sometimes 
implicitly, sometimes explicitly—in feminism generally, and in the work of 
MacKinnon in particular. 
MacKinnon’s response is to raise the question of whether “it is racist to 
speak of ‘women at all’”84—that is, whether it is necessarily essentialistic to 
analyze women “as women.”85 Her answer to both questions is no, that “[i]t 
all depends on how you analyze [women] as women.”86 On a theoretical 
level, few critical race theorists would quarrel with that idea. Undergirding 
CRT’s critique of feminism is an empirical claim that “women’s 
experiences” in feminism have most often meant white women’s 
experiences. CRT’s anti-essentialist critique is not, then, that the category 
“women” necessarily lacks the representational capacity to capture the 
experiences of all women. (Thus, few critical race theorists would argue 
that it is necessarily problematic to structure antipatriarchal intellectual or 
political work around the category “women.”) Instead, it is that an 
unmodified articulation of the category “women”—the conceptualization of 
women as women—has historically peripheralized the social realities of 
women of color. 
It bears mentioning that the consequences of this peripheralization are 
not just theoretical. As the hypothetical beginning this Section (in which a 
firm hires a white woman and a black man, but not a black woman) 
demonstrates, an unmodified conception of gender—by which we mean a 
conception that does not grapple with differences among women—can 
instantiate a modern-day iteration of the cult of true womanhood where the 
question of gender discrimination at work turns on whether the employment 
practice or decision burdens white women. One of the goals of CRT, then, 
is to keep a keen eye on generalizations—even when the generalizations are 
directed towards a particular group, such as women. This critical posture 
helps to prevent the interest and experiences of the dominant members of 
 
82. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 
(1990). 
83. Id. at 585. 
84. MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 72. 
85. Id. at 73. 
86. Id. 
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that group from overdetermining the efforts of the group to pursue 
equality.87 
D. Identity Privilege 
1. Race 
Many white people challenge the idea that they are privileged because 
they are white. They might agree that discrimination is not a thing of the 
past, but would not go so far as to conclude that the existence of 
discrimination renders them privileged. But CRT’s claim about identity 
privilege is nothing more than a claim about the existence of discrimination. 
The notion is this: To the extent that race discrimination is a current social 
problem, there will be victims and beneficiaries of this discrimination. The 
former are disadvantaged; the latter are privileged. Supporting this claim is 
the idea that “[t]here is no disadvantage without a corresponding advantage, 
no marginalized group without the powerfully elite, no subordinate identity 
without a dominant identity. Power and privilege are relational; so, too, are 
our identities.”88 
Yet the concept of relational privilege has had little political traction. 
As Thomas Ross’s contribution to A New Critical Race Theory argues, even 
“right-thinking” white people are unlikely to see themselves as benefited by 
their whiteness.89 Ross attributes this to the fact that many whites accept the 
narrative of white victimology, a narrative that constructs white people as 
innocent victims of affirmative action and political correctness.90 He 
reasons that the difference between “right-thinking [w]hites” and other 
whites is that the former “are likely to accept their [white] burden as an 
appropriate self-sacrifice,”91 in effect as the new White Man’s Burden. 
The concept of white privilege helps us understand contemporary 
discrimination in the workplace. Part of the privilege of whiteness is its 
foundational status. Whiteness functions as the identity against which all 
other identities are measured.92 When combined with male privilege and 
 
87. See generally Devon W. Carbado, Introduction: Where and When Black Men Enter, in 
BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 1 (Devon W. Carbado 
ed., 1999) (exploring whether and to what extent heterosexual black men have a privileged victim 
status in antiracist discourse and politics). 
88. Devon W. Carbado, Straight out of the Closet: Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation, in 
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 221, 227. 
89. Thomas Ross, The Unbearable Whiteness of Being, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
supra note 14, at 251, 254. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. As Barbara Flagg has argued, few people see the foundational status of whiteness 
precisely because this status is so entrenched. See generally BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, 
BUT NOW I SEE (1998). 
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heterosexual privilege (the latter of which we explore more fully below), 
the point can be articulated this way: “He (the white heterosexual man) is 
the norm. The baseline. He is our reference. We are all defined with Him in 
mind. We are all the same as or different from him.”93 
In the context of workplaces that are structured around cooperative 
work, whites do not have to, in terms of race, think about being the same. 
They have a limited need to strategize about how and when to signal an 
integrational capacity to work within teams without causing grit. Whiteness 
is presumptively grease.94 Racial minorities, even if they are allowed into 
the workplace, still have to perform their race in ways that negate the 
presumptions that their race will engender discomfort and cause 
disruptions. The privilege of whiteness lies in not having to do the work to 
negate these, and other, racial presumptions.95 
2. Sexual Orientation 
To the extent that identity privileges are a function of, and help to 
entrench, discrimination, the question is how to dismantle them. None of 
the essays in A New Critical Race Theory articulates an answer. The 
contribution that one of us makes to the volume suggests that the starting 
point might be to identify privileges.96 In constructing an identity privilege 
list, one should have two broad categories in mind. 
One category is “an invisible package of unearned assets which I can 
count on cashing in each day, but about which I was ‘meant’ to remain 
oblivious.”97 A second category is constituted by a set of disadvantages 
that, without effort, one escapes precisely because of one’s identity.98 
Consider what a list of heterosexual privileges might look like: 
• The children of a heterosexual couple do not have to explain 
why their parents have different genders. 
 
93. Carbado, supra note 6, at 228. 
94. The grease and grit conceptions are borrowed from Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and 
Discrimination from a Corporate Perspective: Grease, Grit and the Personality Types of 
Tournament Survivors 20-21 (Nov. 1, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
95. Cf. IAN HANEY-LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 42-44 
(1996) (discussing how whiteness functioned as a prerequisite for naturalization—that is, 
immigrants interested in becoming American had to demonstrate that they were white); see also 
John Tehranian, Note, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of 
Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 820 (2000) (suggesting that determination of who 
was white for purposes of naturalization was based in part on evidence of performance). 
96. Carbado, supra note 88. 
97. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming To 
See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING 
BEHIND THE MIRROR 291, 291 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). 
98. Carbado, supra note 88, at 229. 
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• Heterosexuals do not have to worry about people trying to 
“cure” their sexual orientation. 
• Heterosexuals can join the military without concealing their 
sexual identity. 
• Heterosexuals do not have to worry about “coming out” or 
worry about being “outed.” 
The list could go on. And the social cost of each item can be 
considerable, as Victoria Ortiz and Jennifer Elrod’s contribution to A New 
Critical Race Theory attests.99 Ortiz and Elrod are lesbians. The point of 
departure for their essay is a prologue focusing on the first privilege 
bulleted above. It describes an interaction between their son, Camilo, and 
his best friend in which the friend insists that Ortiz and Elrod could not be 
lesbians because, among other reasons, Ortiz is a Mexican.100 The 
essentialized conception of Mexican families as heterosexual, heterosexist, 
and patriarchal does not allow for the possibility that Elrod could exist 
within a lesbian family context.101 Ortiz and Elrod’s narrative provides an 
indication of how, in a single moment, this essentialism can destabilize and 
delegitimize a family. The event, which likely was neither the first nor the 
last, required Ortiz and Elrod to “reassure” their son and to affirm their 
family existence and legitimacy: 
Yes, his mom really was a lesbian. Yes, he really had two 
moms. Yes, he had been right to stand fast upon the truth that was 
his and ours. Yes, the reality of his life experience was that he was 
the son of two lesbians, and that we were a family.  
And: Yes, there were always going to be people who would 
deny his and our existence, sometimes out of ignorance, sometimes 
out of fear, sometimes out of malice. But that didn’t change the fact 
of our being three valuable individuals or our being a legitimate 
family.102 
 
99. Victoria Ortiz & Jennifer Elrod, Construction Project: Color Me Queer + Color Me 
Family = Camilo’s Story, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 258. 
100. Id.  
101. See generally CHICANA LESBIANS: THE GIRLS OUR MOTHERS WARNED US ABOUT 
(Carla Trujillo ed., 1991) (exploring the complexities of Chicana lesbian experiences); Elvia R. 
Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens, and Lezzies: The Construction of Homosexuality Before 
the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 33 (1995) (discussing the ways in which 
black and Latina/o gays and lesbians have played an important role in shaping gay and lesbian 
identity and political culture). 
102. Ortiz & Elrod, supra note 99, at 258-59. 
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The narrative reveals that there is agency to challenge the extent to 
which identities are overdetermined by stereotypes. Ortiz and Elrod’s 
reassurance to their son is an act of family identity formation. That is to say, 
their assurance socially (re)constructs their social arrangement as a 
“legitimate family.” This reconstruction is necessary (we imagine on an 
ongoing basis) because of the socialization costs that accompany departures 
from heterosexual normalcy.103 
This socialization “tax” extends to the workplace. It can range from 
requiring gays and lesbians to remain in the closet, to requiring them to be 
in the closet with the door partially open, to requiring them to be “but for 
homosexuals”—people who but for their sexual orientation are just like 
everybody else (namely, heterosexuals). Put another way, depending on the 
institutional culture of the workplace, gays and lesbians may have to 
employ a variety of performative strategies to contain, if not hide, their 
sexual orientation. The U.S. military makes this performative obligation 
explicit through its “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, which provides that one 
can be gay in the military so long as one does not perform an explicitly gay 
identity.104 The normalcy and naturalness of heterosexuality—heterosexual 
privilege—exempt heterosexuals from engaging in this identity-based work, 
work that can be both dignity-destroying and identity-compromising. 
E. Multiracialism 
1. Critique of the Black/White Paradigm 
A fundamental tenet of CRT is that racism is a multiracial 
phenomenon.105 This is not to say that each minority racial group 
experiences discrimination in the same way or to the same extent. The point 
is that the effects of racism transcend any single racial group. In this 
respect, it might be more accurate to say that American society is 
characterized not simply by racism but by multiracialism.106 
In CRT, the dominant expression of the idea is the critique of the 
black/white paradigm. Informing this critique is the notion that, for the 
most part, legal and political discussions about racism focus on black and 
 
103. Cf. ADRIENNE RICH, COMPULSORY HETEROSEXUALITY AND LESBIAN EXISTENCE 
(1981) (demonstrating the variety of ways in which heterosexuality is enforced and normalized).  
104. See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467 
(2000) (exploring black antiracist and white gay rights responses to this policy). 
105. See generally Neil Gotanda, Multiculturalism and Racial Stratification, in MAPPING 
MULTICULTURALISM 238 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds., 1996).  
106. Devon W. Carbado, Race, Law & Citizenship: Black Civil Rights Responses to 
Japanese American Internment (Mar. 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) 
(exploring the idea of multiracialism as an explanation for black civil rights responses to Japanese 
American internment). 
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white experiences, ignoring or marginalizing the experiences of nonblack 
people of color.107 Kevin Johnson’s contribution to A New Critical Race 
Theory articulates a version of this argument. 
According to Johnson, CRT’s failure to address the relationship 
between race and immigration, or the racialization of immigration law, 
derives “in part from the longstanding assumption that race relations in the 
United States exclusively concern African Americans and whites.”108 
Johnson’s argument is not simply that the black/white paradigm elides 
nonblack racial subordination: It is also that “[s]uch a binary 
perspective . . . obscures the relationship between the subordination of 
various minority groups.”109 His thinking is that one cannot “appreciate 
fully the treatment of any particular racial group without understanding the 
interrelated and intertwined oppression of all racial minorities.”110  
Johnson employs the concepts of “transference” and “displacement” to 
explain the multiracial way in which racial subordination is interconnected. 
Both transference and displacement are sociopolitical processes: The 
former occurs when racial antipathy towards one group is redirected onto 
another; the latter operates as “a defense mechanism” that results in the 
shifting of negative racial attention from one group to a substitute group 
based on the idea that the substitute group “is psychologically more 
available.”111 One example of transference is Justice Harlan’s famous 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Here, Johnson notes, Justice Harlan argues 
vociferously against black racial segregation and simultaneously legitimizes 
racial discrimination against people of Chinese ancestry, people of “a race 
so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to 
become citizens of the United States.”112 According to Johnson, Harlan’s 
dissent evidences transference in the sense that “[l]egal punishment of the 
Chinese replaced that previously reserved for African Americans.”113 
Paying attention to multiracialism is relevant to understanding 
workplace discrimination. Different minority groups exist as outsiders vis-
à-vis a predominantly white workplace culture for different reasons. Blacks 
are vulnerable to employment discrimination in part because of stereotypes 
about race, crime, intellectual capacity, and work ethic. Asian Americans 
 
107. The standard cite is to Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The 
“Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997). For critiques of the 
argument, see Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
53 (1999); and Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283 (2002). 
108. Kevin R. Johnson, Race and the Immigration Laws: The Need for Critical Inquiry, in A 
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 187, 187. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 188. 
112. Id. at 189 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
113. Id. 
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are vulnerable to discrimination in part because of stereotypes about race, 
loyalty, and national identity. Put differently, blacks have to manage the 
racial impression that they are criminally inclined, intellectually challenged, 
and lazy; Asian Americans have to manage the racial impression that they 
are untrustworthy and foreign. This means that nonwhite employees face 
race-specific pressures to show a willingness and capacity to fit within 
predominantly white workplace cultures. From an employer’s perspective, 
then, racial fit varies across race. While these ideas are consistent with 
Johnson’s critique of the black/white paradigm, they suggest that the 
discourse about the paradigm should not only open up space within 
antidiscrimination theorizing for nonwhite experiences, but also that the 
discourse should open up the category of race itself to include an 
understanding of the performative ways in which nonwhites racialize or 
(re)present themselves to manage the fact that they are “different” and to 
diminish their vulnerability to negative stereotype attribution. 
2. A Critique of the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm 
While it is important to recognize that racism is multiracial, that 
recognition should not obscure the pivotal role that blackness has played in 
structuring American race relations. Mari Matsuda makes this point in her 
essay. She argues that before CRT moves beyond the black/white paradigm, 
it should consider the extent to which the specter of blackness racializes all 
people of color, not just black people. According to Matsuda, “We cannot 
understand American racism unless we understand African American 
history as American history.”114 Blackness, Matsuda explains, has a 
multiracial representational capacity: 
When the Los Angeles Police Department gunned down a Korean 
American traffic violator; when police in Northern California 
murdered an unarmed Chinese American man who was drunk on 
his own front lawn; when a Louisiana jury acquitted a Louisiana 
homeowner who had shot a Japanese teenager who came to the 
door to ask for directions—these are real instances, not metaphors, 
of fear of Blackness killing somebody. This is not to say that 
xenophobic, yellow-peril, Asian-specific forms of racism are absent 
in these cases. Rather, I submit that the quick finger on the trigger 
traces back in history to a whispered name, Nat Turner, and a 
legacy of terror inflicted by the terrified.115 
 
114. Mari Matsuda, Beyond, and Not Beyond, Black and White: Deconstruction Has a 
Politics, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 393, 394. 
115. Id. at 395 (footnotes omitted). 
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Matsuda’s project is not about privileging the black experience: She 
points out that CRT needs to engage how genocide and nativism structure 
American race relations as well. Instead, her aim is to problematize the ease 
with which people express the ideological commitment to “move beyond 
Black and white”116—a move that can mean: “Thank goodness we can get 
off that paradigm, because those Black people made me so uncomfortable. I 
know all about Blacks, but I really don’t know anything about 
Asians . . . and thank God I don’t have to take those angry Black people 
seriously anymore.”117 Matsuda’s claim seems to be that the critique of the 
black/white paradigm can function as a racial comfort strategy by which 
nonblack people of color distance themselves from, and disidentify with, 
black people. She worries that such a strategy is inconsistent with the 
realization that the struggle against racial oppression is a common one for 
all people of color. For some people of color to distance themselves from 
others further subordinates those others and fractures the people-of-color 
community. This plays into the hands of oppressors and makes the struggle 
for racial equality more difficult.118 
Matsuda’s concerns are relevant to workplace racial dynamics. An 
Asian American, for example, may believe that due to negative assumptions 
about race, she has to “comfort” her colleagues about her racial identity—
that is, signal that, notwithstanding her race, she can fit comfortably within, 
and be loyal to, the institution.119 Disidentifying with other Asian 
Americans and/or with other people of color is one mechanism for doing 
so. Both disidentifications convey the idea that, for the Asian American 
employee, racial group association is less important than workplace group 
association.120 
F. Narrative 
Narrative occupies a central space in CRT, and a number of the essays 
in A New Critical Race Theory use it. One critique of CRT is that the 
literature reflects too much narrative and too little doctrinal or analytical 
argumentation. Often implicit in this critique is a notion that narrative is 
easy, but doctrinal analysis takes effort and skill, and that CRT scholars, 
 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. See Caldwell, supra note 107, at 63 (suggesting that a “competitive model [of 
antiracism] leads inevitably to a zero-sum framework which overshadows commonalities and 
emphasizes and reinscribes differences, hostilities, and ultimately, continued subordination”). 
119. We develop the idea of racial comfort more fully in Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8, at 
1301-04. 
120. For a comprehensive and historical look at the relationship among interracial 
associations in the context of marriage, racial subordination, and racial social meaning, see 
RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE (2001). 
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because they are either lazy or lack skill, choose the easy route.121 But if 
one moves beyond assumptions of intellectual inferiority, the question 
becomes interesting: Why do we see so much narrative in CRT? It is not 
favored by the elites in legal academia—elites who decide tenure and 
promotion. One might expect, then, the “weak” or the overly pragmatic—
the ones who are worried about preexisting negative stereotypes about their 
capabilities—to be wary of using techniques that activate those stereotypes. 
Add to this the fact that most CRT scholars are not trained in the use of 
narrative—for the most part, they have had the same legal training as their 
non-CRT colleagues. Yet, CRT scholars, across institutions, use narrative. 
Richard Delgado, a prominent and prolific CRT scholar, and one who was 
careful to avoid writing about race in his pre-tenure scholarship,122 has 
made an explicit “plea for narrative.”123 This suggests that there is 
something about narrative that makes it particularly useful to CRT. But 
what? 
As a threshold matter, a problem with CRT responses to the critique of 
narrative (and, for that matter, the critique itself) is the absence of a 
coherent conceptualization of narrative scholarship.124 Implicit in at least 
some CRT is the notion that to the extent that one is engaged in narrative, 
one is liberated from the regulatory effects of conventionality. However, 
because narratives are themselves discursive conventions, there is no such 
liberation. Narrative simply offers CRT a set of methodologies—
“autobiographies, self-portraits, allegories, fables, and fictive 
narratives”125—to articulate concerns about race and equality. Each of these 
methodologies has its own rhetorical or literary conventions, conventions 
that regulate and constrain expression.  
If to engage in narrative is merely to enact less traditional forms of—
but not to escape—conventionalism, the question becomes: What are the 
payoffs for doing so? There are at least four: 
First, narrative performs an epistemological function. It provides 
knowledge about the nature of discrimination from the perspective of those 
who experience it. But why narrative and why not statistical analysis? After 
 
121. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 12, at 43 (“[C]ritical race theorists teach by example that 
the role of a member of a minority group is to be paid a comfortable professional salary to write 
childish stories about how awful it is to be a member of such a group.”). 
122. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
123. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). 
124. This is not to suggest that there has been no theorizing on the question. See id.; Leslie G. 
Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1878 
(1990). For an indication of the scholarship contesting the legitimacy of narrative, see Carbado, 
supra note 104, at 1284 n.2. 
125. Margaret E. Montoya, Celebrating Racialized Legal Narratives, in A NEW CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 243, 243. 
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all, statistical analysis (assuming a large enough data set) has the benefits of 
identifying a general phenomenon that is verifiable by third parties.126 And 
certainly there is nothing about the use of narrative in CRT that precludes 
critical race theorists from also using statistics. So why not the 
epistemology of statistics rather than (or in addition to) the epistemology of 
narrative? The answer may be that narrative does something that statistical 
analysis does not: It focuses on the specific and provides detail. Statistical 
analyses do the reverse. When an outsider is trying to describe an 
experience to someone who cannot readily relate to it, an insider, narrative 
provides the detail that can help the insider empathize and relate to the 
experience. To employ the language of Clifford Geertz, “We see the lives 
of others through lenses of our own grinding.”127 Narrative helps to situate 
whites in the “grinding” of racial subordination. 
As Julie Su and Eric Yamamoto’s contribution to A New Critical Race 
Theory attests, the epistemological function of narrative has implications 
for political lawyering. A challenge facing political lawyers is to have the 
voices of one’s clients shape and be reflected in the litigation. One problem 
Su encountered when she represented Thai and Latina garment workers in 
litigation over labor conditions was the way the press covered narratives 
about the workers:  
Some media portrayed the workers only as hapless victims, and that 
generated the false impression that they were not human agents 
engaged in a struggle to improve their lives. Those portrayals 
suggested, and sometimes explicitly stated, that heroes—lawyers 
and government agents, usually straight, white men—were the ones 
working to save the downtrodden.128  
Su and Yamamoto argue that part of the project of political lawyering is 
to move client experiences to the foreground and facilitate client 
participation in their lawsuit. Enabling client narratives helps accomplish 
both. In this sense, narrative is not just about the personal experience of a 
particular critical race theorist: It is also about the personal story of the 
client.129 As Su and Yamamoto put it, “One measure of the quality of 
critical race scholarship is the response by the academy. Another, equally 
 
126. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE 
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) (using statistical analysis to demonstrate the existence of 
discrimination). 
127. Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGY 263, 275 (1984). 
128. Su & Yamamoto, supra note 30, at 383-84. 
129. For discussion of the importance of client-centered lawyering, see generally GERALD P. 
LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters, 85 YALE L.J. 
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important measure is whether garment workers in some fashion know that 
critical race theory is talking about their liberation, their justice, too.”130 
A second payoff from using narrative relates to the idea of truth. 
Narrative is a means by which one can challenge “the perfectibility, 
externality, or objectivity of truth.”131 Through narrative, critical race 
theorists can demonstrate the contingency and situatedness of truth. For 
example, the first two essays in A New Critical Race Theory—Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s contribution132 and the contribution of Sumi Cho and Robert 
Westley133—are in dialogue about the “true” genesis of CRT. Of course, 
Cho and Westley would not say that the history they excavate—which 
focuses on student activism as a form of social movement that helped to 
form the “theory”—is true and that the account provided by, among others, 
Crenshaw (which they argue focuses on the “writings that ‘formed the 
movement’”134) is false. Nor are Cho and Westley invested in 
“proliferate[ing] competing genesis stories.”135 But they do mean to suggest 
that the truth about the genesis of CRT is bigger than Crenshaw’s “super-
agency” approach, an approach that they say “emphasize[s] the agency of 
individual scholars.”136 The juxtaposition of Crenshaw’s essay against Cho 
and Westley’s reminds us that while most of the controversy about “truth” 
and CRT arises in the context of contestations between critical race 
theorists and their detractors, the question of what is true—as well as the 
question of how truth should be theorized—is contested (sometimes only 
implicitly) within CRT as well. 
A third benefit of narrative is that it can serve as a counterhegemonic 
device. Through narrative, people of color can counter the dominant 
representations of their identities and their experiences; they can engage in 
what Margaret Montoya refers to as “discursive subversions.”137 This is the 
project in which Henry Richardson engages. He constructs a conversation 
between an African president and an African American law professor. The 
exchange constitutes a form of discursive subversion in that whiteness 
occupies a background and marginal space in the discussion. Put 
differently, the conversation is not mediated by concerns about whiteness or 
black respectability. The professor and the African president speak about 
international politics, domestic sovereignty, and tribal conflicts. The 
conversation is unconstrained by racial surveillance. They appear to be 
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speaking not as subalterns, but as fully formed (or, at least, not overly 
determined) subjects. Presumably, one of the reasons Richardson confers 
this sense of freedom on the professor and the president is to raise a 
question about power: What happens when black people have it? His 
answer seems to be that problems of division and social conflict do not 
necessarily disappear. Michel Foucault’s descriptive claim—that we have 
an ambivalent relationship to power—becomes, in Richardson’s essay, a 
normative one. 
A fourth payoff from using narrative is that it can function as a 
rhetorical strategy to rearticulate the ideological content of various legal 
regimes to demonstrate that, as Enrique Carrasco puts it, “law is essentially 
a story that reflects and legitimates the (racial) viewpoints and interests of 
those in power.”138 Consider Sherene Razack’s contribution to A New 
Critical Race Theory. She employs narrative to uncover the national story 
behind Canadian immigration law: “Canada is besieged. Every Tom, Dick, 
and Harry wants to get in. They will stop at nothing. They do not respect us. 
They will return our generosity with betrayal. We have no choice but to 
become strict and to monitor more closely who is coming in.”139 Razack 
demonstrates how this story is employed to give political and legal traction 
to a variety of mechanisms (for example, the requirement that border 
crossers carry certain identity documents) to police the Canadian border and 
its national identity. 
At bottom, narrative is a methodology. It can be done well or poorly, 
and it is valuable and worth using where it either provides better or 
previously discounted evidence or more effectively persuades than other 
methodologies. In Parts IV and V, we attempt to demonstrate how narrative 
can be utilized to articulate the operation of workplace discrimination. 
G. Summary 
The purpose of the foregoing was to articulate some basic ideas around 
which CRT is organized and to reveal how these ideas are manifested in A 
New Critical Race Theory. The discussion also highlights the ways in 
which each of these ideas can be enlisted to further an understanding of 
workplace discrimination. 
Yet, what we have thus far posited about workplace discrimination is 
limited. None of the CRT ideas we discussed performs a 
structural/institutional critique of the workplace. Further, there is little in 
CRT more broadly that engages in such an analysis. This is not to say that 
 
138. Carrasco, supra note 17, at 367. 
139. Sherene H. Razack, “Simple Logic”: Race, the Identity Documents Rule, and the Story 
of a Nation Besieged and Betrayed, in A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 199, 
200. 
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CRT is unconcerned with the workplace as a racial institution.140 The point 
is that much of that concern manifests itself in the context of critiques about 
specific employment practices that are either explicitly racially coded or 
that have a disparate impact on people of color. 
The scant attention that CRT has paid to the workplace as a cultural 
institution is surprising given CRT’s notion that racism is endemic, 
operating at both an individual and a cultural/institutional level. In other 
words, while CRT is committed to the concept of institutional 
discrimination, there is little in the literature that articulates what this 
means—and even less that reveals how institutional racism is manifested in 
the context of the workplace. We address this gap in Part III. 
III. HOMOGENEITY 
This Part provides a structural critique of the workplace by drawing on 
bodies of literature that economists and behavioral L&E scholars have 
begun to incorporate into their analytical toolbox—organizational behavior, 
management science, and psychology (the “behavioral management 
literature”). Cumulatively, this body of work advances a standard economic 
argument about transaction costs: Employment decisions will be structured 
to reduce them.141 As we show, pursuing homogeneity is one way for 
employers to do so. In short, greater employee homogeneity decreases the 
transaction costs of managing a workforce. 
There is a relationship between the transaction costs associated with 
heterogeneity and CRT’s critique of colorblindness. According to CRT, 
colorblindness encourages (and sometimes coerces) nonwhites to 
assimilate. Colorblindness norms require Asian Americans, for example, to 
identify as individuals (which ostensibly renders them the same as 
everybody else) and to disidentify as members of a racial group (since 
racial group identification renders them different). Seen in this way, 
colorblindness, like transaction costs, functions as a mechanism for 
encouraging homogeneity. An employer motivated by either concern would 
want her nonwhite employees to be assimilated, not differentiated. In this 
sense, even to the extent that employers are not explicitly invested in, or 
consciously driven by, colorblindness, their concerns about the transaction 
costs of heterogeneity motivate them to make employment decisions that 
are consistent with colorblind norms. Our aim in this Part is to employ the 
 
140. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the 
Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395 (1993); see also 
Crenshaw, supra note 76.  
141. Analysis of transaction costs is widespread in legal scholarship. For a recent example, 
see Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 
(2002). 
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link between homogeneity, transaction costs, and colorblindness to develop 
a theory of institutional discrimination. We first articulate this theory, 
which assumes that there is an incentive for employers to pursue 
homogeneity, and then discuss the theoretical basis for, and empirical 
evidence of, the existence of this incentive. 
A. A Theory of Institutional Discrimination 
A starting point for thinking about workplace discrimination is to raise 
the question of whether today’s workplace is buttressed by institutionalized 
racial norms. With respect to explicit racial norms, the answer is no: That 
would violate antidiscrimination law. But do implicit racial norms structure 
today’s workplace culture? CRT answers this question affirmatively, 
pointing to workplace practices like English-only rules and grooming 
regulations (e.g., rules prohibiting employees from braiding their hair) that 
restrict the expression of particular identities and, in so doing, marginalize 
them.142 
There is, however, a subtle form of institutional discrimination to which 
CRT scholars have not paid attention. This discrimination derives from a 
commitment on the part of many employers, particularly employers who 
use teams to manage their workplace culture to achieve trust, fairness, and 
loyalty (TFL). Why? TFL reduces transaction costs. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the effectiveness of teams is enhanced when employers 
engender TFL among their employees.143 Employees who perceive that 
they are a part of a “TFL community” work hard, cooperate, police each 
other, and share valuable information.144 Based on this evidence, scholars 
have argued that law should be structured to facilitate the creation of TFL 
 
142. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 67, at 366-67 (discussing two companies’ anti-braiding 
policies). 
143. The legal scholarship in this vein has largely focused on boards of directors—that is, the 
team at the top of the corporate hierarchy. Hopefully, however, there will be a trickle down effect 
vis-à-vis scholarship that considers the larger organizational context. For articles both applying 
the team conception and drawing from the organizational dynamics literature for insights into 
group behavior, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking 
in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A 
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003); and Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature 
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001). 
144. Scholars who study organizational effectiveness have long recognized that trust, 
fairness, and loyalty are crucial and essential elements in effective organizations. See generally 
Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What 
Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345 (1991); Susan G. Cohen & Diane E. Bailey, What 
Makes Teams Work: Group Effectiveness Research from the Shop Floor to the Executive Suite, 23 
J. MGMT. 239 (1997); Carole V. Wells & David Kipnis, Trust, Dependency, and Control in the 
Contemporary Organization, 15 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 593 (2001). 
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workplaces.145 In addition to its efficiency gains, TFL values seem 
normatively appealing.146 
TFL’s normative surface appeal helps to explain why the institutional 
discrimination story we articulate below has not yet been told. Central to 
our story is not the fact that employers are invested in TFL but rather how 
they go about realizing that investment—by aggressively promoting 
homogeneity. Evidence suggests that, at least in the short term, a manager 
with a demographically homogeneous work team has a better chance of 
producing TFL than one with a diverse team. If, as is often suggested, 
managers focus primarily on short-term results,147 there is an incentive for 
managers to seek demographically homogeneous teams. 
The relationship between the pursuit of demographic homogeneity and 
racial discrimination is direct. In short, workplaces organized to achieve 
homogeneity are likely to discriminate because homogeneity norms, by 
their very nature, reflect a commitment to sameness (favoring people 
perceived to be members of the in-group (“insiders”)) and a rejection of 
difference (disfavoring people perceived to be members of the out-group 
(“outsiders”)). Coupled with the fact that, within most professional settings, 
whites are insiders and nonwhites are outsiders, the relationship between 
discrimination and homogeneity becomes clear. 
The foregoing suggests that race-neutral workplace norms 
institutionalize insider racial preference. Is this a reason for concern? The 
answer is not obviously yes. One might argue that, even to the extent that 
there are incentives for employers to create and maintain homogeneous 
workplaces, the threat of antidiscrimination sanctions undermines that 
incentive. Richard Epstein famously worried about exactly this effect of 
antidiscrimination law. According to Epstein, part of the problem with 
antidiscrimination law is that it compromises workplace efficiency by 
preventing employers from establishing homogeneous workplace 
cultures.148 One might conclude, then, that given the threat of legal 
 
145. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001); Kent 
Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics To Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as 
Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002). Legal scholars engaged in this inquiry have 
noted the important role that perceptions of trust, fairness, and loyalty play in corporate 
governance. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Robert Cooter & 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717 
(2001). 
146. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
185, 199 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
147. See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 145 (using, as a building block for his argument, the 
claim that managers focus excessively on short-term results).  
148. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 59-87 (1992). The inconsistency between 
the goal of enhancing trust levels in organizations that many progressive scholars espouse and the 
goal of enhanced ethnic diversity in the workplace that progressives also presumably favor has 
been pointed out by Steve Bainbridge in his critiques of the progressive corporate law scholarship. 
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sanctions, the institutionalized racism problem we have identified is 
theoretical—not real. 
Moreover, there are institutional legitimacy concerns that militate 
against the establishment of homogenous workplaces. White-only work 
forces can create public relations problems. Perhaps not surprisingly, there 
is no employer-driven movement afoot to have antidiscrimination laws 
repealed because they prohibit employers from establishing 
demographically homogenous workplaces. To the contrary, even a cursory 
examination of the management and organizational behavior literature 
reveals (at least rhetorically) an institutional commitment to manage, and 
not to eliminate, heterogeneity.149 Thus, all seems well: Law prevents 
institutions from privileging homogeneity, and institutions perceive the 
pursuit of homogeneity to be problematic. 
Our claim, however, is that all is not well. Neither antidiscrimination 
law nor the affirmative pursuit of diversity operates as a meaningful barrier 
to, or substantially undermines the incentives for employers to achieve, 
workplace homogeneity. Epstein need not worry.150 To be sure, the law 
prohibits blatant racial animus in hiring and promotion. But that is a 
minimal barrier to the managerial pursuit of racial homogeneity. To move 
from a phenotypic conception of race to a performative conception is to 
find that, to a significant extent, judges can (and, we surmise, do) apply 
 
His argument is based on the observation that trust is most likely to be present in organizations 
that are ethnically homogenous. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the 
Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 
799 (1998). Structuring law to promote trust, Bainbridge argues, therefore means enabling the 
creation of homogenous workforces, something that is presumably inconsistent with the 
progressive agenda. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative 
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 
885 (1997) (book review). 
The observation that ethnically homogenous communities may have reduced transaction 
costs has also been made in the nonfirm (or market) context. At least some such communities 
appear able to police wrongdoing (such as contractual opportunism) even in the absence of court 
systems—a valuable trait in contexts where court systems are either too expensive to use or are 
unavailable. For a recent examination, see Kevin Davis et al., Ethnically Homogeneous 
Commercial Elites in Developing Countries, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 331 (2001). 
149. See, e.g., Jacqueline A. Gilbert & John M. Ivancevich, Effects of Diversity Management 
on Attachment, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1331 (2001); Orlando C. Richard & Nancy Brown 
Johnson, Understanding the Impact of Human Resource Diversity Practices on Firm 
Performance, 13 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 177 (2001); Mark John Somers & Dee Birnbaum, 
Racial Differences in Work Attitudes: What You See Depends on What You Study, 15 J. BUS. & 
PSYCHOL. 579 (2001); Tom R. Tyler & Maura A. Belliveau, Managing Work Force Diversity: 
Ethical Concerns and Intergroup Relations, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 
INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 171 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
150. Consistent with the caricature of L&E, for Epstein, the problem is that there is too much 
governmental interference in the labor market—specifically, regulation that causes inefficiencies 
by not allowing employers to set up racially homogenous teams. See EPSTEIN, supra note 148, at 
66-67. Our claim, consistent with the caricature of CRT, albeit employing literature that is 
becoming a part of the behavioral L&E canon, is the reverse: Law does not do enough to prevent 
employers from setting up racially homogenous teams. 
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antidiscrimination law to actually protect the pursuit of racial 
homogeneity.151 They do so by failing to capture employment 
discrimination based on intraracial distinctions—distinctions employers 
make among people within a particular racial group.  
Driving these distinctions is a question about racial stereotypes and 
racial salience. Other things being equal, employers prefer nonwhites 
whose racial identity is not salient and whose identity performance is 
inconsistent with stereotypes about their racial group.152 In other words, 
employers screen for racial palatability. With respect to Asian Americans, 
for example, employers determine whether, notwithstanding phenotypic 
difference, a particular Asian American is (based on how she performs her 
identity) sufficiently like insiders to be successfully assimilated into a 
homogenized workplace.  
To date, there are no Title VII cases that render a racial palatability 
discrimination claim cognizable. Thus, employers can make these kinds of 
intraracial distinctions with legal impunity. And to the extent employers 
engage in this practice, their associated institutional legitimacy remains 
intact because the practice anticipates and produces at least some workplace 
 
151. In a work in progress, we are exploring the assimilationist orientation of Title VII law, 
an orientation that is structured around protecting homogeneity. 
152. Recent scholarship has described this point in terms of multiple identity theory or 
“identity comprehension” theory. The starting point is the observation that all of us have a 
multiplicity of identities. But there are some identities that are more important to us than others. 
For example, just because a person is Indian does not mean that his Indian identity is important to 
him. To the contrary, it may be that his identity as an engineer is so important to him that he may 
consciously choose to avoid associating too much with other Indians. More important, depending 
on context, we choose (whether consciously or unconsciously) to emphasize certain identities and 
deemphasize others. Hence, to continue the Indian example, he may keep his Indianness at home 
(where he eats Indian food, watches Indian movies, talks about Indian politics, and hangs out with 
his Indian friends in his Indian neighborhood), while being a team player with his white American 
colleagues at work. Given the necessity of picking some racial outsiders, managers will likely 
pick those outsiders who deemphasize their outsider identities (at least at work). On identity 
comprehension theory, see Sherry M.B. Thatcher, Does It Really Matter if You Know Me? The 
Implications of Identity Comprehension Theory on Individuals in Organizational Teams (May 
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). The building blocks of this theory are the 
observations: (1) that people have a multiplicity of identities that they “negotiate”; (2) that these 
identities can be changed or maintained as increased amounts of information are communicated; 
and (3) that people’s initial judgments about others can change over time. On the building blocks, 
see Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 20 (1989) (arguing that people have a multiplicity of identities that they carry with 
them at all times); Myron Rothbart & Bernadette Park, On the Confirmability and 
Disconfirmability of Trait Concepts, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 131 (1986) 
(explaining that identities can be changed or maintained as increased amounts of information are 
received); and William B. Swann, Jr. et al., Should We Create a Niche or Fall in Line? Identity 
Negotiation and Small Group Effectiveness, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 238 (2000) 
(describing identity negotiation as one of the mechanisms that determines how identities evolve in 
diverse workgroups and whether stereotypes are negated or reinforced). For a study of the huge 
variety of verbal, nonverbal, and proxemic cues that people use to negotiate identity in the 
workplace, see Sherry M.B. Thatcher et al., Subjective Identities and Identity Communication 
Processes in Information Technology Teams, in 5 RESEARCH IN MANAGING GROUPS AND TEAMS 
53 (Margaret A. Neale et al. eds., forthcoming 2003). 
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racial integration. Finally, because the racial diversity employers achieve by 
making intraracial distinctions is literally skin deep, it comfortably coexists 
with their commitment to homogeneity. 
The foregoing sets forth a theory of institutional racism—that it is a 
function of an investment on the part of employers to realize the efficiency 
gains of homogeneity. Because many institutions operate under what we 
call a diversity constraint—a constraint that requires the firm to hire at least 
some nonwhites—employers will determine which nonwhites to hire on 
evidence of racial palatability. The more racially palatable employers 
perceive a potential employee to be, the less concerned they will be over the 
possibility that that potential employee will (racially) disrupt workplace 
homogeneity. 
In order for our theory to have traction, we need to provide evidence 
suggesting that employers are, in fact, motivated to pursue homogeneity. 
We do so below, fleshing out the theories and empirical evidence 
suggesting that homogenous workplaces are more efficient and effective 
than heterogeneous workplaces. Before turning to this literature, however, 
four caveats are in order. First, this literature focuses largely on team-
oriented workplace cultures. It has little to say about workplaces within 
which employees work in isolation from each other. Second, the efficiency 
gains that employers experience from homogeneous work teams are largely 
short term. There is evidence (which is by no means definitive) to suggest 
that, in the long run, heterogeneous teams are better problem solvers and 
more creative than homogenous teams. Even to the extent that this evidence 
is right, it does not significantly undermine the story we are telling, 
because, by and large, managers—who hire and promote—need to 
demonstrate results in the short term. 
Nor is our story undermined by the dangers of “groupthink,” where the 
absence of dissent in the face of too much group cohesion and identification 
can cause organizations to ignore important information.153 At first blush, 
this groupthink dynamic may seem to undermine employer incentives to 
pursue homogeneity: Racial diversity might promote the kind of dissent 
necessary for teams to operate creatively and productively.154 But employer 
concerns about groupthink are not likely to be nearly as powerful as their 
concerns about lowering transaction costs and achieving the psychological 
 
153. The classic work on the subject is IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982). Janis 
writes that “members of any small cohesive group tend to maintain esprit de corps by 
unconsciously developing a number of shared illusions and related norms that interfere with 
critical thinking and reality testing.” Id. at 35. 
154. For an extensive discussion of the costs of conformity and the value of dissent, see CASS 
SUNSTEIN, CONFORMITY AND DISSENT (forthcoming 2003). 
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benefits that come with conformity.155 Further, there is reason to question 
the idea that racial diversity is the type of diversity that managers would 
look to in order to counter the groupthink dynamic. First, as we have said, 
managers are likely motivated primarily by short-run results. Thus, they 
tend to ignore institutional strategies, like enhancing racial diversity, the 
value of which shows up only in the long term. Second, while racial 
diversity undoubtedly increases tension levels within a group, it is not clear 
that this tension will necessarily lead to a productive exchange of ideas. 
Some researchers have suggested that there are two broad categories of 
conflict—one based on personal dislike (unproductive conflict) and the 
other based on a difference in perspective (productive conflict)—and that 
race and gender differences are more likely to produce the former while 
differences in tenure and educational background are more likely to 
produce the latter.156 Third, there is evidence to suggest that, even if they 
disagree, members of lower-status groups are less likely to speak out within 
heterogeneous groups.157 This is perhaps because the homogeneity 
incentive discourages outsiders from engaging in conflict that could 
entrench or reignite the notion that they are different. 
Our third caveat is that, although the literature on the effectiveness of 
homogeneity is broad, the subset that focuses specifically on racial 
dynamics is small. Generalization from studies addressing invisible 
demographic variables, such as education and background, to visible 
attributes, such as race and gender, is necessarily controversial.158 And 
finally, our treatment of this literature is preliminary, inexpert, and 
 
155. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1569, 1578 (2000) (“The stress reduction leads to better focus, concentration, and 
persistence.”). 
156. In the context of studying the positive and negative effects of conflict, Karen Jehn 
distinguishes between “relationship conflicts” (where disagreements are about personal issues) 
and “task conflicts” (where disagreements are about ideas and opinions relating to the task). Jehn 
explains that relationship conflicts are more likely to occur with race and gender diversity and be 
destructive to the team’s functioning, while task conflicts are more likely to occur with education 
and job tenure diversity and are likely to be productive. See Karen A. Jehn, A Qualitative Analysis 
of Conflict Types and Dimensions in Organizational Groups, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 530 (1997); 
Karen A. Jehn et al., To Agree or Not To Agree: The Effects of Value Congruence, Individual 
Demographic Dissimilarity, and Conflict on Workgroup Outcomes, 8 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 
287 (1997). 
157. See Rod Bond & Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies 
Using Asch’s Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 111 (1996) (finding that women are 
more likely to conform than men); Caryn Christenson & Ann S. Abbott, Team Medical Decision 
Making, in DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 267, 273-76 (Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A. 
Sonnenberg eds., 2000). 
158. See Karen A. Jehn et al., To Agree or Not To Agree: The Effects of Value Congruence, 
Member Diversity, and Conflict on Workgroup Outcomes, 13 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 
(forthcoming 2003); Melenie J. Lankau & Terri A. Sandura, An Examination of Job Attitudes of 
White, Black, and Hispanic Nurses in a Public Hospital, 19 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 377 (1996); 
Lisa Hope Pelled, Demographic Diversity, Conflict, and Work Group Outcomes: An Intervening 
Process Theory, 7 ORG. SCI. 615 (1996); Somers & Birnbaum, supra note 149. 
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incomplete. The literature is vast, and the scholars who have produced it 
might take issue with some of what we say. Our sense, however, is that the 
basic idea we employ this literature to support—that there is an incentive 
for employers to pursue homogeneity—is uncontroversial within the 
literature. We hope that our analysis will invite other legal scholars, 
particularly critical race theorists, who are interested in both workplace 
discrimination and racial diversity management to engage this largely 
unexplored body of work. 
B. The Incentive for Employers To Pursue Homogeneity 
Below we discuss the incentives for employers to seek workplace 
homogeneity. First, we provide a theoretical account regarding the nature 
of, and basis for, these incentives. Second, we discuss the empirical 
evidence suggesting that employers are invested in homogeneity. In both 
discussions, we assume that employers operate under a diversity constraint. 
That is, we assume that a firm’s interest in homogeneity will, for legal and 
institutional legitimacy reasons, be constrained by the need to achieve some 
degree of workplace racial diversity. 
1. Theories 
There are at least three theories suggesting that employers are 
motivated to pursue homogeneity: social identity theory, similarity-
attraction theory, and statistical judgments theory. 
Social identity theory suggests that people have an affinity for those 
they perceive to be part of their in-group.159 In concrete terms, people are 
more likely to demonstrate TFL (which, again, is shorthand for trust, 
fairness, and loyalty) to those they perceive to be members of their in-
group.160 Conversely, they are more likely to discriminate against those 
they perceive to be members of an out-group.161 Race, being both socially 
 
159. On social categorization and social identification theory, see MICHAEL A. HOGG & 
DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS (1988); HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND 
SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1981); JOHN C. TURNER, 
REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION THEORY (1987); and John C. 
Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1982). 
160. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A 
Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979). 
161. The result of a perception of otherness has been demonstrated to lead to prejudice and 
stereotyping, and that, in turn, can significantly hurt the effectiveness of the work team. See 
Jennifer Crocker & Brenda Major, Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties 
of Stigma, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 608 (1989); Harry C. Triandis et al., Workplace Diversity, in 4 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 769 (Harry C. Triandis et al. 
eds., 1994). 
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salient and facially visible, is one of the primary categories along which 
people make initial in-group and out-group categorizations.162 One 
explanation is that people assume that those of a similar race are likely to 
share similar values and to have had similar experiences. As a result, racial 
outsiders are vulnerable to discrimination from their racial insider 
colleagues.163 To avoid this distrust and dislike (which will likely 
undermine workplace efficiency by increasing transaction costs), employers 
will want to hire people who are similar to insiders. 
The similarity-attraction theory is largely analogous. It posits that 
people are attracted to those who are similar.164 The theory is that race is 
one of the primary categories used to determine similarity and that this 
similarity, in turn, translates into attraction. Once again, as with social 
identity theory, those who appear facially similar are assumed to share the 
same values and norms of communication.165 Under this paradigm, racial 
minorities are presumptively dissimilar and unattractive,166 characteristics 
 
162. Race and gender categories are used so often in categorizing others that these 
categorizations likely occur automatically, without active thought or effort. See Charles Stangor et 
al., Categorization of Individuals on the Basis of Multiple Social Features, 62 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 207 (1992). Whether stereotype activation is always automatic or can be inhibited 
by other factors (such as cognitive overload and self-image threat) has been a topic of debate. See 
Steven J. Spencer et al., Automatic Activation of Stereotypes: The Role of Self-Image Threat, 24 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 (1998). 
163. See Jennifer A. Chatman et al., Being Different yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of 
Demographic Composition and Organizational Culture on Work Processes and Outcomes, 43 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 749, 750 (1998); see also Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizational Demography, in 5 
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 299 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Straw eds., 1983). 
164. The standard reference is DONN BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM (1971). See also 
Donn Byrne, An Overview (and Underview) of Research and Theory Within the Attraction 
Paradigm, 14 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 417 (1997). The need for individuals to feel 
similar has been linked by scholars to the need to belong to a group (hence, linking similarity 
theory to social identity theory). See Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need To Belong: 
Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
497 (1995); Marilynn B. Brewer, Social Identity, Distinctiveness, and In-Group Homogeneity, 11 
SOC. COGNITION 150 (1993). 
165. See Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly, III, Demography and Diversity in 
Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 77, 85 
(1998). 
166. While there is a significant body of research demonstrating the affiliative preferences 
people have for others who are similar, there is also research suggesting that people value others 
who allow for trait expression. In other words, there may be a preference for those who are 
complementary (which often will translate to similarity, but not always). For example, a dominant 
person may prefer to affiliate with someone who is subservient rather than similar. While we 
found little research exploring complementarity in the race and diversity context, it strikes us that 
it might be important. For example, white male workers may prefer other white male workers who 
are similar, while simultaneously preferring black or women workers who are subservient. All of 
this is in the way of saying that the similarity hypothesis strikes us as overly simplistic as applied 
to race. For an examination of similarity and complementarity in the workplace context, see 
Robert P. Tett & Patrick J. Murphy, Personality and Situations in Co-Worker Preference: 
Similarity and Complementarity in Worker Compatibility, 17 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 223 (2002). 
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that, from an insider-employer perspective, have the potential to create 
workplace conflict and division, not cooperation and cohesion.167 
The final theory suggesting that employers are motivated to pursue 
homogeneity is statistical judgments theory. Most often attributed to 
economics (though also central to psychology), this theory claims that 
racial differences often activate statistical judgments about likely 
behavioral tendencies. These statistical judgments are a type of mental 
shortcut, a resource-saving device. For example, white workers may see a 
new black colleague as likely to be lazy, untrustworthy, disloyal (especially 
to her white colleagues), frequently angry (perhaps as a result of 
oversensitivity about race), and difficult to communicate with (due to her 
likely having different values, different interests, and different cultural and 
experiential points of reference).168 Under this theory, whether an insider-
employer will hire a black person turns on the currency of the foregoing 
statistical judgments. The stronger the statistical judgment, the stronger the 
employer’s perception that a prospective black employee will not fit into 
the institution. 
These theories suggest that there is a disincentive for employers to hire 
outsiders and a corresponding incentive for employers to hire insiders. 
Difference engenders distrust, dislike, disconnection, disidentification, and 
disassociation. Each of these characteristics (and certainly all of them 
together) undermines a necessary condition for the effective operation of 
teams—cooperative behavior—and therefore increases the transaction costs 
of managing the workplace. 
2. Empirical Evidence 
a. The Basic Story 
In addition to the theoretical literature, there is empirical evidence 
predicting that racially heterogeneous teams are likely to be less effective 
than homogenous ones. Studies consistently show what the above theories 
suggest: Racial heterogeneity undermines trust and cooperation.169 Team 
 
167. The operation of this paradigm can result in the attrition of those outsiders who are 
hired. This dynamic is referred to as the Attraction-Selection-Attrition hypothesis. See Benjamin 
Schneider, The People Make the Place, 40 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 437 (1987). 
168. See, e.g., Stephen Coate & Glenn C. Loury, Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate 
Negative Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1220 (1993); Craig McGarty et al., Social, Cultural 
and Cognitive Factors in Stereotype Formation, in STEREOTYPES AS EXPLANATIONS 1 (Craig 
McGarty et al. eds., 2002); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972). 
169. On the flip side, there are studies, most of which were conducted in laboratories, that 
suggest that heterogeneous teams are better at coming up with creative solutions to problems than 
homogenous teams. See, e.g., Taylor H. Cox et al., Effects of Ethnic Group Cultural Differences 
on Cooperative and Competitive Behavior on a Group Task, 4 ACAD. MGMT. J. 827 (1991) 
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members in heterogeneous teams tend not to communicate as well as team 
members in homogeneous teams. Turnover rates in heterogeneous teams 
are higher.170 And managerial attempts to spur innovation by diversifying 
their teams have “met with mixed success.”171 
b. The More Complicated Account 
Recent scholarship on diversity management suggests that the empirical 
story about workplace homogeneity may be more complicated than we have 
thus far described. The complication is that heterogeneity can operate as a 
double-edged sword.172 To appreciate how this is so, it is helpful to 
conceptualize heterogeneity/diversity as operating in a two-stage process.173 
 
(finding positive effects from ethnic heterogeneity). On the claim that diversity (and particularly 
racial diversity) has the potential to provide firms with a competitive advantage through increased 
creativity and enhanced problem-solving capabilities, see TAYLOR COX, JR., CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (1994); and Taylor H. Cox 
& Stacy Blake, Managing Cultural Diversity: Implications for Organizational Competitiveness,  
5 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 45 (1991). More generally, on the “value in diversity” claim, see 
Anne Donnellon, Crossfunctional Teams in Product Development: Accommodating the Structure 
to the Process, 10 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 377 (1993); Kathleen M. Eisenhart & Claudia 
Bird Schoonhoven, Organizational Growth: Linking Founding Team, Strategy, Environment, and 
Growth Among U.S. Semiconductor Ventures, 1978-1988, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 504 (1990);  
L. Richard Hoffman & Norman R.F. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem Solutions by 
Members of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 401 
(1961); and Michael L. Tushman, Special Boundary Roles in the Innovation Process, 22 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 587 (1977). 
170. For articles that synthesize the literature on diversity on teams (including the limited 
research on racial diversity), see S.E. Jackson et al., Understanding the Dynamics of Diversity, in 
TEAM DECISION MAKING EFFECTIVENESS IN ORGANIZATIONS 204 (Richard A. Guzzo et al. eds., 
1995); Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads: Understanding 
the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 402 (1996); 
Orlando C. Richard et al., The Impact of Visible Diversity on Organizational Effectiveness: 
Disclosing the Contents in Pandora’s Black Box, 8 J. BUS. & MGMT. 1 (2002); and Williams & 
O’Reilly, supra note 165. For the most part, these articles all talk about the basic issues with 
teams—communication, attachment, trust, and conflicts. On the effects of diversity on supervisor-
worker relations and issues such as receptivity to feedback from a supervisor who is perceived to 
be from a different group, see Heather J. Smith et al., The Self-Relevant Implications of the 
Group-Value Model: Group Membership, Self-Worth, and Treatment Quality, 34 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 470 (1998). 
171. See Chatman et al., supra note 163. More generally, on the point that attempts to 
capitalize on the various forms of diversity have led to ambiguous results in practice, see Richard 
A. Guzzo & Marcus W. Dickson, Teams in Organizations: Recent Research on Performance and 
Effectiveness, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 307 (1996); and Madeline E. Heilman, Affirmative Action: 
Some Unintended Consequences for Working Women, in 16 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR 125 (Barry M. Straw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1994). 
172. Milliken & Martins, supra note 170, at 403; Richard et al., supra note 170; Williams & 
O’Reilly, supra note 165, at 79. 
173. Our division of the interaction process into stages one and two is a product of the 
observation by numerous scholars in the area that diversity, while likely to cause initial problems 
in group functioning, has the potential to bring benefits in the longer term. See, e.g., Richard et al., 
supra note 170, at 18. The most often cited research on this point is a laboratory study of 
culturally homogenous and diverse groups for seventeen weeks, where the homogenous groups 
initially performed better but the heterogeneous groups improved and eventually outperformed the 
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At stage one, superficial differences in terms of variables like race cause 
distrust, difficulties in communication, and a reluctance to cooperate. 
However, under the right conditions of intergroup contact—equal status, 
opportunities for self-revelation, egalitarian norms, and tasks that require 
cooperative interdependence—diverse team members can, at stage two, 
gain each other’s trust, begin to see commonalities, work cooperatively, and 
realize the benefits of working as a diverse team.174 Central to this theory is 
the notion that there are meaningful things an employer can do at stage 
one—the initial contact stage—to facilitate cooperative behavior at stage 
two.175 
Broadly speaking, employers can use both individual and 
organizational strategies to manage heterogeneity in order to achieve the 
short-term efficiency gains of cooperative behavior (and the long-term 
gains of creative problem solving). Organizational strategies, however, are 
expensive and, from neither an insider nor an outsider perspective, have had 
much success. Individual strategies are cheaper and relatively successful 
from an institutional-insider perspective, but raise normative questions 
about (intra)racial selectivity. The problems with these two categories of 
strategies, upon which we elaborate below, strengthen the argument that 
employer incentives to pursue homogeneity are strong. 
i. Organizational Strategies 
Scholars have found that heterogeneous teams fare better in 
organizations that have a collectivistic, as opposed to an individualistic, 
orientation.176 Such organizations emphasize the importance of 
 
homogenous groups on certain measures. Warren E. Watson et al., Cultural Diversity’s Impact on 
Interaction Process and Performance: Comparing Homogeneous and Diverse Task Groups, 36 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 590 (1993); see also Katherine Xin, The Secret of Success, HKUST BUS. SCH. 
NEWSL., Summer 2000, at http://www.bm.ust.hk/newsletter/summer2000/summer00-10.html 
(describing studies reporting that while initial impressions that were formed on the basis of visible 
characteristics such as race, age, and gender caused tensions, these tensions can disappear over 
time (under certain conditions)). 
174. For reviews of this literature, see ROBERT E. SLAVIN, COOPERATIVE LEARNING (1983); 
and David W. Johnson et al., Goal Interdependence and Interpersonal Attraction in 
Heterogeneous Classrooms: A Meta Analysis, in GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
DESEGREGATION 156 (Norman Miller & Marilyn B. Brewer eds., 1984). 
175. Increased contact, however, does not always lead to improvements in the effectiveness 
of the team. Sometimes, the initial dysfunction that results from prejudices and stereotyping at 
stage one can worsen over time. Joel V. Merkwan & Timothy B. Smith, Tolerance and Racial 
Identity Among Foreign Sojourners: Testing the Contact Hypothesis, 85 PSYCHOL. REP. 170 
(1999); Belle Rose Ragins & Terri A. Scandura, Antecedents and Work-Related Correlates of 
Reported Sexual Harassment: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Hypotheses, 32 SEX 
ROLES 429 (1995); Paola Villano, Anti-Semitic Prejudice in Adolescence: An Italian Study on 
Shared Beliefs, 84 PSYCHOL. REP. 1372 (1999). 
176. See Chatman et al., supra note 163; see also Jennifer A. Chatman & Francis J. Flynn, 
The Influence of Demographic Heterogeneity on the Emergence and Consequences of 
Cooperative Norms in Work Teams, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 956 (2001). 
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organizational identity, an emphasis that helps reduce the salience of 
outsider distinctiveness (such as race).177 For example, one’s identity as a 
McKinsey consultant might be so important that it makes one feel a special 
bond with other McKinsey consultants (regardless of their outsider racial 
identity).178 The problem is that such group-based institutional identities are 
difficult to establish. 
There is also support for the proposition that heterogeneity functions 
better in “multicultural” environments than it does in “assimilationist” 
environments. That is, organizations that emphasize the importance of 
diversity manage heterogeneity better than those that stress conformity and 
assimilation.179 But to say that multicultural environments manage diversity 
better than assimilationist environments does not answer the question of 
how well the former perform on other measures of efficiency (such as cost 
minimization). It is one thing for an employer to establish a workplace 
culture that tolerates diversity; it is likely to be farm more complex and 
expensive for that employer to establish a workplace culture that values and 
respects diversity.180 
A final organizational strategy available to manage heterogeneity is 
diversity training.181 It is not clear, however, that these programs work, and 
they are expensive to institutionalize.182 
 
177. See Chatman et al., supra note 163. 
178. The dynamic is also relevant to how we experience our identities as Americans. In other 
words, there are certain moments where, at least on the surface, we experience ourselves as one 
nation. Some have argued that this has happened in the wake of 9/11. But see Leti Volpp, The 
Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (arguing that the post-9/11 consolidation 
of American identity was achieved by an insider/outsider dynamic in which some people were 
disidentified as citizens and reidentified as terrorists). 
179. See Charles A. O’Reilly, III et al., Group Demography and Innovation: Does Diversity 
Help?, in 1 RESEARCH ON MANAGING GROUPS AND TEAMS 183 (Deborah H. Gruenfeld ed., 
1998) (reporting that an organizational culture supporting ethnic diversity has positive effects on 
performance); David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm 
for Managing Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 79 (finding that organizational 
cultures where diversity is seen as an opportunity to learn as opposed to a legal requirement are 
more effective). 
180. For a discussion of the complexities involved in creating such cultures, see Richard & 
Johnson, supra note 149, at 181-84. See also Richard et al., supra note 170, at 17 (discussing the 
value of a pro-diversity orientation in terms of enabling a group to tackle effectively the 
complications that diversity brings with it). 
181. For a description of the research on training strategies, see Karen Jehn & Katerina 
Bezrukova, A Field Study of Group Diversity, Group Context, and Performance (July 1, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (discussing these training strategies under the 
rubric of “human resources practices” to manage diversity). 
182. For a review of the evidence on the effectiveness of diversity training programs, see id. 
Cf. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of 
Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 125 
(2002) (describing the ineffectiveness of diversity training programs in tackling sexual 
harassment). 
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ii. Individual Managerial Strategies 
Assuming that organizational strategies are likely to be ineffectual at 
managing diversity, the question is whether there are individual strategies 
that supervisors “on the ground” can employ to manage the institutional 
difficulties heterogeneity creates. Strategies implemented at the 
organizational level—such as taking steps to alter a firm’s culture or hiring 
diversity consultants—are generally in the hands of those at the top of the 
institutional hierarchy. Most managers—the ones who directly supervise 
work teams—have little say over such matters. 
Managers do, however, have say over the terms upon which employees 
interact with each other. A manager interested in heterogeneity could 
socialize people of different backgrounds—insiders and outsiders—to work 
together. And this socialization effort could focus on both groups in an 
attempt to get members from each to internalize a norm of cooperative 
behavior across difference.183 
Are managerial socialization efforts in fact so focused? While there is 
no empirical evidence on this question, there is reason to believe that 
managerial efforts do not focus equally on insiders and outsiders. The fact 
that there are inevitably fewer minority workers means that it is likely to be 
cheaper to socialize them into the majority in-group than it is to socialize 
the in-group to respect and value difference. In addition, there is evidence 
suggesting that minority workers are (presumably out of necessity) more 
willing to deal with heterogeneity than are white workers.184 That is to say, 
although whites, for instance, have not been socialized to accommodate 
nonwhites, nonwhites have been socialized to accommodate whites. As a 
result, it has come to be expected that nonwhites, but not whites, will give 
up their differences. 
C. Summary 
There is theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that employers 
are motivated to pursue homogeneity: Put simply, homogeneous 
 
183. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace as a Locus of Integration in 
a Diverse Society, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 331; Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The 
Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Estlund, Working 
Together]. 
184. See Lisa Hope Pelled et al., Demographic Dissimilarity and Workplace Inclusion, 36 J. 
MGMT. STUD. 1013 (1999); Anne S. Tsui et al., Being Different: Relational Demography and 
Organizational Attachment, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 549 (1992). The result that racial outsiders are 
generally better at dealing with the effects of heterogeneity appears to hold for sex as well (males 
have more negative reactions to gender dissimilarity than females). See Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, 
Beyond Direct and Symmetrical Effects: The Influence of Demographic Dissimilarity on 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 273, 282-84 (1999); Tsui et al., supra, 
at 570-71. 
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workplaces facilitate trust, loyalty, and cooperative behavior. The story 
with respect to heterogeneous work teams is different. First, at an 
institutional level, heterogeneity is difficult and costly to manage. Second, 
the most cost-effective way for individual supervisors to manage 
heterogeneity is to “socialize away” outsider difference. Thus, it is more 
accurate to characterize this strategy as eliminating, rather than managing, 
heterogeneity. Third, even assuming that heterogeneity can be effectively 
managed, the benefits of a heterogeneous workplace are speculative, and 
they are realized primarily over the long term. 
Acknowledging the homogeneity incentive is helpful to CRT in at least 
two ways. First, it provides critical race theorists with a different 
perspective on colorblindness. The homogeneity incentive exists because of 
the transaction costs of heterogeneity.185 Like colorblindness, then, the 
homogeneity incentive requires the submersion of racial difference. Second, 
the existence of the homogeneity incentive supports CRT’s claim that an 
employer’s preference for racial sameness won’t always be motivated by 
racial animus. One of the most important ideas in CRT is that racism is not 
just a function of individual bad actors.186 From here, CRT advances one of 
two arguments: (1) that discrimination is unconscious and (2) that 
discrimination is institutional. The homogeneity incentive provides an 
additional base from which to theorize about the latter. It demonstrates that 
institutional discrimination can exist in the absence of racial animosity. Part 
IV strengthens this claim by broadening the discussion to include an 
indication of how employers respond to the homogeneity incentive. 
IV. HOW EMPLOYERS RESPOND TO THE HOMOGENEITY INCENTIVE 
Given antidiscrimination laws and social norms disfavoring racial 
exclusivity, institutions are unlikely to respond to the homogeneity 
incentive by hiring only insiders. They will hire outsiders as well. The 
 
185. Scholars have begun to explore the question of whether there is some normative basis 
upon which it is legitimate to impose these costs on employers. See Estlund, Working Together, 
supra note 183 (arguing that the workplace is a site for the development of social capital, and that 
the law, at least to some extent, should increase outsiders’ access to this social capital); Christine 
Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 648 (2001) (observing 
that disparate treatment law can be conceptualized as a form of accommodation to the extent that 
it “requires employers to incur special costs in response to the distinctive needs . . . of particular, 
identifiable demographic groups of employees, such as individuals with (observable) disabilities, 
and imposes this requirement in circumstances in which the employer has no intention of treating 
the group in question differently on the basis of group membership”); Mark Kelman, Market 
Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 850-52 (2001) (suggesting that because of the 
weight of values of inclusion and integration, it is not necessarily problematic for 
antidiscrimination law to impose the cost of accommodation on employers). 
186. The classic articulation of this idea is Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 
62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
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claim we advance is that employers will use specific mechanisms to screen 
outsiders for evidence of racial palatability. These mechanisms select “but 
for outsiders”—outsiders who, but for their racial phenotype, are very 
similar to the insiders—and they select against “essential outsiders”—
outsiders whose personal characteristics are consistent with the image of the 
prototypical outsider. This Part argues that these selection mechanisms are 
produced by employer commitments to homogeneity. They allow 
employers to determine which outsiders to hire—a determination that 
focuses on which outsiders can fit within the workplace without unduly 
compromising its homogeneity. The argument develops in two parts. First, 
we elaborate on the functions of selection mechanisms and articulate their 
connection to a related mechanism—socialization. Then we identify four 
selection mechanisms and illustrate how they operate. We conclude by 
explicitly engaging CRT to demonstrate the racial costs of each mechanism. 
A. The “Race-Neutral” Response to the Homogeneity Incentive 
1. The Basic Idea: Selection and Socialization 
Broadly speaking, there are two mechanisms employers can use to 
respond to the homogeneity incentive: “selection” and “socializing” 
mechanisms.187 Selection mechanisms operate at the hiring and the 
promotion stages. Here, an employer screens individuals for particular 
characteristics that function as proxies for determining whether a given 
individual (1) is willing to be homogenized into the workplace culture and 
(2) has the capacity to do so. Socializing mechanisms, in turn, are used to 
initiate and integrate the individual into the workplace. In other words, 
socializing mechanisms are the rites of passage that structure a new 
employee’s experiential travels through the workplace after selection 
mechanisms are used to bring her into the firm. Constituting this passage 
are numerous rituals through which the individual is expected to 
demonstrate her commitment to homogeneity. More particularly, she must 
effectively prove that the employer made the right selection decision. Due 
to space constraints, we do not elaborate further on socialization 
 
187. On the socialization and selection processes that organizations use, see Jennifer A. 
Chatman, Matching People and Organizations: Selection and Socialization in Public Accounting 
Firms, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 459 (1991); Gary Alan Fine & Lori Holyfield, Secrecy, Trust, and 
Dangerous Leisure: Generating Group Cohesion in Voluntary Organizations, 59 SOC. PSYCHOL. 
Q. 22 (1996); Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, 
Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 569 (1999); Charles O’Reilly, Corporations, 
Culture, and Commitment: Motivation and Social Control in Organizations, 31 CAL. MGMT. REV. 
9 (1989); Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Socialization and the Profession of Management, 30 
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 53 (1988); John F. Tomer, Organizational Capital and Joining-Up: Linking 
the Individual to the Organization and to Society, 51 HUM. REL. 825 (1998); and Bruna Nota, The 
Socialization Process at High-Commitment Organizations, PERSONNEL, Aug. 1988, at 20. 
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mechanisms.188 We focus on selection, identifying four selection 
mechanisms employers can use to screen potential employees for evidence 
of performative (and not simply phenotypic) homogeneity. 
2. The Selection Mechanisms 
Four interrelated selection mechanisms that we draw out of the theory 
and evidence on homogeneity are: similarity, comfort, differentiation, and 
respectable exoticism. 
a. Similarity 
This mechanism is intuitive. The question is whether the individual 
exhibits personal characteristics suggesting she is similar to employees 
already at the firm. The more an individual appears to be similar to existing 
employees, the more likely an employer is to conclude that the individual 
has the potential to be assimilated. The potential employee’s response to 
standard interview questions can signal her potential for assimilation to 
employers. Consider, for example, Johnny, who is being considered for a 
mid-level associate position at an elite corporate law firm. A senior partner 
has asked Johnny to “tell us a little bit about yourself.” Johnny’s response 
includes the following: 
I enjoy tennis and golf, though I confess that both need 
improvement. I like a good Gore Vidal novel; in fact, I’m in the 
process of rereading Julian, which, by the way, I highly 
recommend. I’m not a huge sports fan, but I try to make time to 
watch a good basketball game—usually with colleagues and 
friends. I wasn’t always fond of theater, but two years ago my wife 
took me to see The Tin Man, and I’ve been sold on theater—both 
high and low—ever since. I enjoy Italian cinema, the old Fellini 
stuff as well as some of the more contemporary productions. And 
every so often, I truly enjoy a good B movie—not a B movie 
masquerading as an A movie, but a B movie that knows it’s a B 
movie. I love going to the museum with my kids. We try to go twice 
a month. You’d be surprised at the interpretational skills of a six-
year old.  
This response provides the employer with signals about Johnny’s 
socialized identity, information that the employer can use to make a 
determination as to whether Johnny is sufficiently like the firm’s existing 
employees. Johnny plays tennis and golf, the preferred sports of corporate 
 
188. Another reason we focus on socialization mechanisms is that employers are less likely to 
be sued for failing to hire than they are for failing to promote. 
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America. The fact that both need improvement suggests that he is available 
to play both sports with his colleagues and not likely to be unduly 
competitive when he does so. In this way, both games can function as sites 
for socialization. Johnny’s response also indicates that he is not an avid 
sports fan, but that he enjoys a good basketball game. Here, Johnny signals 
respectable (but not hyper-) masculinity and a willingness to participate in 
group-based spectator sport rituals. Johnny is married with kids, which 
reveals his heterosexuality and possibly a certain traditionalism. He appears 
to be cultured (he reads Gore Vidal, watches Italian cinema, attends the 
theater, and visits museums), but he is not overly elitist or pompous (he 
enjoys the occasional B movie and attends low-brow (and just barely high-
brow) theater). Finally, the fact that Johnny’s wife successfully socialized 
him into the theater, an experience that he was not predisposed to enjoy, 
suggests that he will likely not resist the firm’s socialization efforts. 
Not every institution will select for the foregoing qualities: Similarity 
selection mechanisms will vary from institution to institution. The point 
here is twofold: (1) Most employers will have a set of characteristics that 
they perceive to define their workplace, and (2) without much difficulty, 
employers can screen for these qualities in interviews. 
b. Comfort 
Related to similarity is comfort. Here, employers want to know whether 
incumbent employees will be comfortable working with the prospective 
hire. Again, they can select for comfort (or at least select against 
discomfort) by considering a prospective employee’s response to standard 
interview questions. Stipulate once more that Johnny is interviewing for a 
job with an elite corporate law firm. The partner asks Johnny: “Tell us what 
kind of firm you’re looking for.” Johnny responds: 
I am looking for a firm doing high-level, sophisticated corporate 
work. Quite frankly, most of the firms I am interviewing with seem 
to fall in that category—certainly your firm does. What becomes 
important for me, then, is firm culture. I am looking for a firm that 
values and respects difference. I guess I believe that people 
shouldn’t have to lose themselves at work. They should be 
permitted to be who they are. I was happy to learn that your firm 
recently adopted a casual Friday policy. 
I am also looking for a firm within which junior associates have a 
voice—that is, an opportunity to comment on the institutional 
governance of the firm, for example, the firm’s billing, hiring, and 
pro bono policies. That sort of participation helps to make junior 
associates invested in the firm. 
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Employers could interpret Johnny’s response in a number of ways. But 
if they are screening for comfort, a given employer may have concerns 
about whether Johnny “fits.” Johnny’s view is that individuals should be 
permitted to be themselves and that a firm should value difference. 
However, difference can be uncomfortable or discomforting. To employ 
what many would consider an extreme example, the firm would likely be 
uncomfortable with Johnny coming to work as a cross-dresser. If Johnny 
does cross-dress, the firm would expect him to do so (if at all) outside of the 
workplace. 
Recall that Johnny wants a voice in institutional governance and 
provides an indication of the kinds of issues he hopes to engage. Johnny’s 
representations here might send a positive signal—specifically, that he 
wants to become a part of the firm. To the extent the employer is selecting 
for comfort, however, the employer could interpret Johnny’s comments to 
suggest that he will likely make the firm uncomfortable about its hiring, pro 
bono, and billing practices, among other institutional governance matters. 
c. Differentiation 
Employers are most likely to utilize the differentiation mechanism 
when they perceive themselves to be making a “risky hire.” Here, 
prospective employees are in a category that is presumed to be incapable of 
homogenization (or that is disinterested in socialization). Imagine that 
Johnny is seeking an entry-level job with a law firm. He is a third-year law 
student at State Law School, which is a third-tier law school.189 He is on 
law review and has an A- grade point average. His letters of 
recommendation are effusive; his writing sample is strong. 
The firm has never hired a law student from State Law School, in part 
because the school is insufficiently elite and because most of the students at 
State Law School are from working-class backgrounds. The firm therefore 
assumes that these students are likely to have difficulty fitting into an elite 
corporate law firm. The firm might not be right for them (read: they might 
not be right for the firm). Given this concern, whether the employer hires 
Johnny will be a function of whether Johnny can differentiate himself from 
the category within which he is situated—that is, State law students. 
Consider the following exchange between Johnny and a senior partner. 
 
189. U.S. News & World Report explains its use of tiers to rank law schools as follows:  
In its ranking of law schools beyond the top 50 institutions, U.S. News lists 
schools in three tiers. Law schools within each tier should be considered broadly 
similar in quality . . . . To be ranked, a law school must be accredited and fully 
approved by the American Bar Association and must draw most of its students from the 
United States. 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 2002, at 66. 
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Partner: Good of you to stop by. Come in and have a seat. It seems 
that I’ve left your resume elsewhere in the office. You wouldn’t 
happen to have an extra copy, would you? 
Johnny: Yes, in fact I do. 
Partner: Oh yes . . . I am beginning to remember this resume. I see 
that you went to Harvard undergrad and that you rowed crew. How 
did we do this year? I graduated Harvard in ‘75. 
Johnny: We lost to Yale, second year in a row, no pun intended. I 
suppose if we’re going to lose to any school, it ought to be Yale. 
Their heavyweight eight was selected to represent the country at 
the World Championships in London. 
Partner: So you did really well at Harvard—Magna in history, 3.7 
GPA, member of the debating team. I suspect that you had a lot of 
options when you applied to law school. 
Johnny: I was fortunate to have a few. In addition to State, NYU, 
Columbia, and Michigan said yes. Harvard and Stanford placed me 
on a waiting list. Yale said no. 
Partner: I didn’t get into Yale, either. What’s more, I’ve lived to 
tell the tale. You will, too. But, seriously, you had all these options. 
I’m curious as to how you made your decision. 
Johnny: Well, to a considerable extent my decision was a financial 
one. I couldn’t afford to attend any of the other schools. And I 
didn’t want to burden my parents anymore than I had to. Besides, I 
hoped that if I distinguished myself at State, I would have many of 
the same opportunities as if I had attended, say, Michigan. 
Partner: So, Johnny, tell me about how you’re thinking about law 
firms. Big law firms are not for everyone, and as you know, we’re a 
pretty big law firm. 
Johnny: I had the good fortune of clerking for two summers at 
Bronton, Stevely & Kellog in Chicago. 
Partner: Yes, yes, an excellent firm. 
Johnny: I had a good time there. People got along well. They had 
interests similar to mine. I got the sense that the attorneys there felt 
that they were part of a larger community. Your firm describes 
itself in precisely that way. Most of my classmates run away from 
big firms. Why go through that haze, some ask? 
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Partner: They consider big firms a haze? 
Johnny: Some do. Most simply believe that big firms treat 
individuals as fungible commodities. That’s not my assumption but 
it is the predominant assumption on campus. 
Partner: What’s your view, then? Let me guess: You love big firms? 
Johnny: Of course. Kidding aside, I’d say that, whether it’s a big 
firm or a small firm, the question is really twofold: whether the 
individual is committed to becoming a part of a team and whether 
the firm provides him with the opportunity to play ball. 
The foregoing reflects enough differentiation on Johnny’s part to 
effectively remove him from, or at least situate him on the periphery of, the 
outsider group (again, students at State Law School). Presumably, few law 
students at State attended Harvard. Johnny’s Harvard education is 
significant in at least three respects. First, it signifies Johnny’s intellectual 
capacity. Second, the fact that Johnny graduated from Harvard (and rowed 
crew) suggests that he has the potential for socialization. Finally, Johnny’s 
Harvard education places Johnny and the partner in a community that has 
significant cultural capital—the community of Harvard alumni. That the 
partner recognizes this shared community is evident in his question: “How 
did we do this year?” 
Nor would many students at State have had the opportunity to attend 
NYU, Michigan, and Columbia or to clerk at an elite corporate law firm. 
Here, too, Johnny is different. Finally, Johnny is also different in terms of 
his strong academic performance and the fact that he does not have a bias 
against big-firm practice. In short, after completing the interview with 
Johnny, the partner could tell himself that, although, as a formal matter, 
Johnny belongs to the group of State Law students, in a substantive sense, 
he is different. It is this kind of information that the differentiation selection 
mechanism is designed to ascertain. 
d. Respectable Exoticism 
Certain differences do not threaten firm homogeneity. To the extent that 
a given difference is both exotic (not an awful lot of people are likely to 
have it) and respectable (the difference is not overdetermined by a negative 
social meaning), firms can commodify this difference to their advantage. 
Thus, while hiring too many immigrants might compromise a firm’s 
commitment to homogeneity, hiring an immigrant of royal lineage might 
not produce that effect. Immigrant difference that is located in the context 
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of royal identity can be marketed—for example, to employees who might 
feel special because they have a royal coworker.190 
Another example of respectable exoticism might be an ex-NBA player 
in a corporate context. Note, however, that while a firm’s homogeneity 
might tolerate one such individual, it may not be able to tolerate several. 
The incentive for the employer to utilize the exotic difference selection 
perhaps is not as strong as the employer’s incentive to utilize similarity, 
comfort, or differentiation. In this respect, it might be more accurate to say 
that a firm will not select against respectable exoticism than it would be to 
say that the firm will actively select for that characteristic.191 
B. Explicitly Racializing the Discussion: Combining CRT Insights  
The preceding discussion does not identify the racial effects of 
selection mechanisms. These effects can be demonstrated by adopting 
CRT’s methodology of racializing the analysis. To borrow from Jerome 
Culp, we “raise . . . the race question”192 and, in the process, make a 
number of empirical assumptions about race. While we think the 
assumptions are plausible, the analysis is necessarily tentative and meant 
only to be illustrative of the type of analysis that might be performed. 
1. How Likely Is It That Johnny Will Be a Racial Minority? 
How likely is it that “Johnny” will be a racial minority? Consider, for 
example, the Johnny who is a student at State Law School. Recall that this 
Johnny attended Harvard College and rowed crew. Rowing crew often 
means that one attended an elite East Coast prep school, and the number of 
minorities who fit in this category will be small. Further, although Johnny is 
at State Law School, he had the option of attending first-tier law schools. 
Not many students of color at a third-tier law school will have had that 
 
190. Note that respectable exoticism is consistent with the client-driven focus of firms. Firms 
quite literally market their associates to clients. 
191. In terms of social identity theory, this is referred to as out-group favoritism. Research 
has shown that people are not necessarily hostile to out-group members and that there can even be 
out-group favoritism. This type of favoritism occurs when the status hierarchy is perceived to be 
stable and legitimate. For a discussion of the literature on out-group bias, see, for example, 
Russell Spears et al., The (Il)legitimacy of Ingroup Bias: From Social Reality to Social Resistance, 
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY 332 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001). 
192. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act: The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 967 (1993); cf. Mari J. 
Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
1183, 1189 (1991) (suggesting that communities engaged in antisubordination work “ask the other 
question”). 
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opportunity. In short, few minorities will have the kind of cultural capital 
reflected in Johnny’s background.193 
2. Assuming That the Johnny at State Law School Is Black,  
Will He Be “Selected”? 
Our hypothetical assumes that an elite corporate firm would select a 
person like Johnny, notwithstanding the fact that Johnny does not fit the 
standard profile (that is, a person who has attended a first-tier law school). 
But if Johnny is black, this issue is far from clear. Few elite corporate firms 
hire blacks from schools other than those in the first-tier—more 
specifically, in the top ten. This may be (at least in part) due to two 
assumptions. The first is an assumption about affirmative action and 
intellectual competence—namely, that given race-based admission 
preferences, “smart blacks” should end up at first-tier schools. The second 
is an assumption about race and class—namely, that a black person at State 
Law School is likely to be working class and thus may have difficulty 
fitting into the law firm. While both assumptions can be rebutted, doing so 
would require an employer to engage in more intensive (read: more costly) 
screening of Johnny. 
3. As a General Matter, What Kind of Person of Color  
Is Johnny Likely To Be? 
Except for respectable exoticism, each of the selection mechanisms 
described above is designed to ascertain the extent to which a prospective 
employee is different from firm insiders. The outsiders likely to be the least 
different from the firm’s insiders are those on (or who perform their identity 
as if they are on) the periphery of their outsider group identity. These “most 
peripheral outsiders” are likely to have grown up in predominantly white 
neighborhoods and to have attended elite (and predominantly white) high 
schools, colleges, and law schools. Employers can use these background 
characteristics as proxies for whether, and to what extent, outsider 
candidates will fit comfortably into a predominantly white workplace.194 
But there is a more direct method the employer can use to determine 
whether an outsider has the capacity to work within a homogenized 
workplace. There is evidence suggesting that particular types of outsiders 
 
193. For a general theory of cultural capital, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF 
CULTURAL PRODUCTION (Randal Johnson ed., 1993). For a discussion of the relationship between 
cultural capital and race, see Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of 
Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1995). 
194. See DAVID A. THOMAS & JOHN J. GABARRO, BREAKING THROUGH: THE MAKING OF 
MINORITY EXECUTIVES IN CORPORATE AMERICA 83-94 (1999). 
CARBAGULFINAL 5/5/2003 3:31 PM 
2003] Critical Race Theory 1811 
are, from an employer’s perspective, likely to cause fewer problems in the 
operation of a team dominated by insiders than are other types of 
outsiders.195 Racial outsiders who are “extroverted” and effective at “self-
monitoring” are more likely to succeed than those who are not.196 Good 
self-monitors assess how others perceive them and adjust their behavior 
accordingly; extroverts project a strong and identifiable self-identity.197 
Presumably, the reason these types of outsiders cause minimal disruption is 
that they actively engage in “impression management.”198 That is, they are 
constantly interacting with others, sending signals about themselves, and 
reacting to the impressions that others have of them.199 An employer’s 
selection decision likely will take account of how well outsiders manage 
impressions about their racial identity (that is, at least in part, how well they 
disprove racial stereotypes). 
4. How Do People of Color Signal Racial Differentiation? 
The point of differentiation strategies is to convey one of three ideas—
that one does not identify as an outsider, that one is a different kind of 
outsider, or that what others think of outsiders is wrong. To convey the first 
idea, that one does not identify as an outsider, an employee would engage 
in disidentification or disassociation strategies—strategies that signal that 
the employee does not really identify with his outsider group. Imagine that, 
in the context of an interview with an elite firm, a partner says this to 
Johnny: “I have to tell you, Johnny, racial diversity at our firm is not good. 
We do our best. But the numbers are what they are—not pretty.” That 
statement offers Johnny an “opportunity” to articulate his relationship to his 
outsider identity. To disidentify and disassociate, Johnny can say: “I 
appreciate your telling me this, but I am more interested in learning about 
how your firm cultivates and trains junior associates.” Johnny’s response 
could also reflect even stronger evidence of outsider disidentification and 
disassociation. He might have said: “I appreciate your telling me this, but I 
just don’t believe in identity politics. Diversity is fine and good, but people 
 
195. For the most part, the legal literature on organizations has paid little or no attention to 
the research on the personality “types” likely to succeed in organizations. For a recent exception, 
see Langevoort, supra note 94. 
196. See Francis J. Flynn et al., Getting To Know You: The Influence of Personality on 
Impressions and Performance of Demographically Different People in Organizations, 46 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 414 (2001); see also Xin, supra note 173. 
197. See Flynn et al., supra note 196; Xin, supra note 173. 
198. On impression management and its cousin, influence tactics, as applied to the case of 
Asian American managers, see Katherine R. Xin, Asian American Managers: An Impression 
Gap? An Investigation of Impression Management and Supervisor-Subordinate Relationships, 33 
J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 335 (1997); and Katherine R. Xin, Different Strokes for Different Folks? 
Influence Tactics for Asian-American Managers and Caucasian-American Managers, 7 
LEADERSHIP Q. 109 (1996). 
199. See sources cited supra note 196. 
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are people.” The point is that the earlier response is enough differentiation 
to suggest to the employer that Johnny is not a “race man.”200 
To convey the second idea of differentiation, that one is a different kind 
of outsider, the outsider could adopt an individualized stereotype negation 
strategy. Here, the outsider would attempt to convey to the employer that 
stereotypes about his outsider identity do not apply to him. Imagine that the 
employer asks Johnny what he does with his spare time and Johnny 
responds: “Fishing, golfing, and catching up on foreign cinema.” The 
employer could interpret this response to suggest that Johnny is not an 
ordinary black man (who, based on stereotypes, would have responded: 
“Watching basketball, playing basketball, and listening to hip-hop.”). To 
the extent the employer does not perceive Johnny to be a black male 
prototype, the employer is less likely to attribute negative stereotypes of 
black men to Johnny. 
Johnny can convey the final idea of differentiation—that others’ 
assumptions about outsiders are wrong—through generalized stereotype 
negation. Under this strategy, Johnny attempts to persuade the employer 
that stereotypes about the employee’s outsider group are inaccurate. This 
strategy is difficult and risky to perform when one is interviewing for a job. 
For instance, after articulating what he likes to do in his spare time (fishing, 
golfing, and catching up on foreign cinema), Johnny could add something 
like: “Not all black men like basketball. Moreover, most of the stereotypes 
about blacks are simply inaccurate. Consider, for example, crime . . . .” It is 
unlikely that, in the context of an interview, Johnny would engage the 
employer in this way: The statement presupposes that the employer harbors 
stereotypes about blacks, a presupposition that could engender racial 
discomfort on the part of the employer (“This black guy thinks I am a 
racist.”). Further, even if Johnny did make such a statement to the 
employer, it is unlikely that the employer would be persuaded by it. For 
generalized stereotype negation to work, there needs to be a level of trust, 
and sustained interaction, between the outsider and the employer. 
Performing each of the foregoing differentiation strategies constitutes a 
form of work—identity work. Among other problems with this work, it can 
compromise one’s sense of identity.201 
 
200. Cf. HAZEL V. CARBY, RACE MEN (1998) (developing the concept of a “race man” in 
relation to specific black political and historical figures). 
201. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8, at 1289-90. Note that not all nonwhites are going to 
be similarly situated with respect to the extent to which they have to perform their work. The 
more privileged the outsider, the greater her cultural capital and the less likely she is to experience 
the performative stereotypes we describe as work. 
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5. What Are the Racial Community Costs of Differentiation 
Strategies? 
One of the problems with the first two differentiation strategies 
(disidentification/disassociation and individual stereotype negation) is that 
they are individually oriented. To the extent that an employee feels 
pressured to perform these strategies, he privileges his individual 
advancement over that of his group. Differentiation strategies are a 
response to an institutionalized problem—the employer’s investment in 
homogeneity. So long as the homogeneity incentive drives employment 
decisions, there is little room for racial diversification. Society ends up with 
minimal (or token) outsider economic advancement into the workplace. The 
incentives for the outsider group, therefore, should be to engage in a 
collective struggle to change the system to tolerate (if not welcome) greater 
expression and representation of outsider identities. The first two 
differentiation strategies undermine that goal. They encourage outsiders to 
disidentify with, and disassociate from, the collective interests of the 
outsider group. In this sense, the problem with homogeneity is not simply 
that it drives employers to hire only certain kinds of outsiders, but also that 
the outsiders whom the employer hires are not likely to lift as they climb.202 
To summarize, the employer’s pursuit of a homogenous workforce is 
likely to produce the following effects (subject to the assumptions made): 
• Given the negative presumption that applies to the ability and 
willingness of outsiders to satisfy the homogeneity requirement 
(and the positive presumptions that apply to whites), the 
quantum of cultural capital (or the price of entry) that 
employers require of outsiders is likely to be higher than that 
for their white counterparts. 
 
202. The question of what types of minorities and what type of strategies (individual mobility 
versus collective advancement or some combination) the current employment structure privileges 
strikes us as one of the most interesting and important areas of research for the immediate future. 
Initial research findings suggest that there is reason to be concerned because the types of outsiders 
who are permitted to advance are those who are least likely to help those left behind (this makes 
sense if the criteria for advancement are that the outsider demonstrate distance from the outsider 
group and affinity for the insider group). In economic terms, tokenism can easily be an 
equilibrium solution as opposed to a stage in the move towards equality. For some of the papers in 
this area, see Naomi Ellemers, Individual Upward Mobility and the Perceived Legitimacy of 
Intergroup Relations, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 191, at 205; Naomi 
Ellemers et al., Sticking Together or Falling Apart: In-Group Identification as a Psychological 
Determinant of Group Commitment Versus Individual Mobility, 72 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 
(1997); Spears et al., supra note 191, at 332; Stephen C. Wright, Restricted Intergroup 
Boundaries: Tokenism, Ambiguity, and the Tolerance of Injustice, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
LEGITIMACY, supra note 191, at 223; Stephen C. Wright & Donald M. Taylor, Responding to 
Tokenism: Individual Action in the Face of Collective Injustice, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 647 
(1998); and Stephen C. Wright & Donald M. Taylor, Success Under Tokenism: Co-option of the 
Newcomer and the Prevention of Collective Protest, 38 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 369 (1999). 
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• Within the outsider community, only the elite are likely to 
possess the quantum of cultural capital necessary to gain entry. 
Employers seeking to satisfy the diversity constraint will 
affirmatively pursue this small subset of minorities. 
• The strategies that an individual outsider employee is likely to 
pursue, such as differentiation, may hurt the collective cause of 
her minority group and compromise her sense of self. The 
collective cause may be better served by a struggle to reduce 
and remove barriers, as opposed to a competition among 
outsiders for a few slots (and which requires outsider 
homogenization). 
Given the foregoing racial implications of selection mechanisms, the 
question arises as to whether there should be legal intervention. If the 
answer is yes, still another question is: What form should that legal 
intervention take? We explore these questions in Part V. 
V. SELECTING THE RIGHT LAW TO REGULATE SELECTION MECHANISMS 
A. Introduction 
This Part explores whether law can restrict institutions from using the 
selection mechanisms described above. As a formal doctrinal matter, the 
answer is unclear. Elsewhere, we have hinted that the answer is probably 
no, but there are reasons to answer the question in the affirmative as well.203 
This Part articulates two approaches the law could take to negotiate 
concerns about homogeneity: an assimilationist approach and a difference 
approach. We employ two hypothetical cases to give content to both 
approaches. First, we discuss the nature of these cases. As you will see, 
they present different concerns about the selection mechanisms described 
earlier. Next, we discuss how each case would be resolved under the 
competing models of discrimination. Finally, we question which model 
makes the most sense. Here, we take up not only problems of doctrinal 
manageability (that is, whether the problems we attribute to selection 
mechanisms are too complicated for either or both models to manage) but 
also problems of normativity (that is, assuming that both models can 
respond to the complexities we describe, which response—the 
assimilationist response or the difference response—is the most appealing). 
Central to this latter issue is an engagement of the racial costs of choosing 
one model over the other. 
 
203. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 77.  
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B. Two Cases of Discrimination 
Whether law should be employed to regulate employers’ use of 
selection mechanisms to make intraracial distinctions is likely to be a 
function of one’s normative views about (1) the value of assimilation and 
(2) the importance of (short-term) workplace efficiency. Under an 
“assimilationalist” approach, employers would be permitted to make 
intraracial distinctions. Under a “difference” approach, they would not. 
Further, the more weight one gives to the employer’s right to maximize 
workplace efficiency, the less concerned one will be about selection 
mechanisms. The hypothetical below helps demonstrate these points. 
The Employment Law Center, a progressive employment litigation 
group in San Francisco, is looking for a test case to illustrate the problems 
of discrimination in large corporate law firms. The Center’s attorneys have 
narrowed their choice of cases to two. Both involve senior black female 
associates who work at different elite San Francisco firms. While both 
associates have high performance ratings, neither made partner. Both allege 
race discrimination, and the attorneys at the Center are divided on the 
question of which case to pursue. Because they have had a spot of bad luck 
with their most recent cases, they are looking for something close to a 
“smoking gun.” 
Case one involves Lauren. Lauren is a graduate of Yale College and 
Harvard Law School. Her parents are academics (one teaches at Tufts and 
the other at MIT), and she grew up in Concord, Massachusetts. At the firm, 
she was an active member of the recruiting committee and the training 
committee, and she could be counted on when emergency projects arose. 
All in all, Lauren was well-liked at the firm. Her senior colleagues 
considered her the consummate team player. She had a reputation for 
professional appearance; both clients and coworkers often admired her 
understated but elegant Armani suits. Finally, Lauren and her husband Joe, 
an investment banker at Morgan Stanley, were frequent attendees at the 
firm’s social functions. Most associates and many partners at the firm had 
assumed that Lauren would make partner. Indeed, five of the firm’s 
partners sent her e-mail messages expressing disappointment with the 
firm’s decision. 
Case two involves Taneka. Taneka’s parents are immigrants from 
Trinidad and Tobago. They moved to Queens, New York, when Taneka 
was twelve. Taneka grew up in Queens, where she spent her weekends 
helping her parents at their Roti restaurant. After completing her B.A. 
summa cum laude in Ethnic Studies at Hunter College, Taneka attended 
Seton Hall Law School. There, she was an editor of the law review and a 
member of the moot court board. She graduated Seton Hall near the top of 
her class, and she was the only member of her graduating class to receive 
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an offer at the firm. With respect to firm activities, Taneka was involved 
with the firm’s diversity committee (on which she was vociferous in urging 
the firm to hire more women, minorities, and students from lower-ranked 
schools such as her alma mater). In terms of behavior, Taneka was known 
for her boisterous personality and exuberance. Her slight Caribbean accent 
was often commented upon as “cute,” and her clothes were considered 
“funky.” Taneka insisted on wearing her hair in braids, despite comments 
from some senior women that this might be perceived as being 
unprofessional. She attended few of the firm’s social functions, but the 
partners often commented on how well she got along with the 
(predominantly colored) support staff. 
The attorneys at the Center are divided on which of the two cases to 
pursue. 
1. The Attorneys Who Support Lauren’s Case 
The attorneys who support Lauren’s case (the Pro-Lauren Attorneys) 
argue that it constitutes a “perfect example of discrimination.” They claim 
that, but for her race, Lauren was just like the white associates the firm 
promoted. Indeed, based on her annual evaluations, she outperformed them. 
Moreover, she had attended the right schools; spoke with the right accent; 
got along with everyone, including the right partners; dressed in the right 
manner; and even laughed at the right jokes. The Pro-Lauren Attorneys 
argue that, given the foregoing, the only explanation for the negative vote 
on her candidacy is race: A significant number of the firm’s partners were 
simply unwilling to vote for a black woman—any black woman, even a 
“really likeable” and “really qualified” black woman like Lauren.204 
The Pro-Lauren Attorneys argue, moreover, that there are difficulties 
with Taneka’s case that derive from the fact that law firm cultures promote 
assimilation of all, and not just nonwhite, attorneys. That is, firms expect all 
of their associates to fit in, not just the nonwhite ones. Firms harbor this 
expectation, the Pro-Lauren attorneys argue, to promote efficiency and 
avoid costs; people with similar cultural/self-presentation practices work 
better as a group and are more productive than people with dissimilar 
cultural/self-presentational practices. From this perspective, it makes sense 
for firms to establish and promote homogeneous workplace cultures. 
 
204. As this Review was in the editorial stages, we came across a report of a racial 
discrimination case filed by Patricia Russell Brown, a Harvard-educated lawyer, against the law 
firm Dorsey & Whitney. The report in the Washington Post quoted Brown’s lawyer as saying: 
“My client is a double-Ivy League graduate, a JAG [Judge Advocate General] lawyer . . . [and] a 
real-life ‘Cosby Show’ lawyer, married to a medical doctor. If they treat her this way, imagine 
how they treat other people.” James V. Grimaldi, Well-Credentialed Lawyer Accuses Minneapolis 
Firm of Racial Discrimination, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2003, at E10 (first alteration in original).  
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The Pro-Lauren Attorneys reject the claim that cultural homogeneity is 
a code term for racism. They note the myriad race-neutral ways in which 
firms typically achieve homogeneity: by requiring their associates—white 
and nonwhite—to attend firm social events (to encourage collegiality and 
the building of team spirit) and to dress and comport themselves in 
particular ways (to encourage professionalism), among other things. They 
argue that a legal decisionmaker will likely conclude that that is precisely 
what Taneka’s firm required of her. Framed this way, Taneka’s case is not 
about discrimination; it is about her refusal to comply with neutral 
workplace rules that are intended to achieve efficiency, promote 
professionalism, and encourage community building. Stated differently, the 
Pro-Lauren Attorneys’ argument is that Taneka’s case presents a behavioral 
problem, not a racial one: Taneka was not a team player. She chose to exist 
on the outside of the firm’s culture. She chose not to fit in. But this 
argument about “fit” and “cultural homogeneity” cannot be advanced 
against Lauren. Lauren fit in well, and she both complied with and helped 
promote the cultural norms of the firm. As a result, the only possible 
explanation for the firm’s decision to deny Lauren a promotion is her skin 
color. Accordingly, they urge their colleagues to support Lauren’s case over 
Taneka’s. 
2. The Attorneys Who Support Taneka’s Case 
The attorneys pushing Taneka’s case (the Pro-Taneka Attorneys) argue 
that Lauren’s case is far from perfect. They agree that Lauren fit in well at 
the firm. She was one of the boys—that is, that she was practically an 
insider. The Pro-Taneka Attorneys argue, however, that it is precisely 
Lauren’s insider status that makes her case a difficult one: Neither a jury 
nor a judge is going (to want) to believe that Lauren experienced 
discrimination. To do so, they would have to conclude that, almost fifty 
years after Brown v. Board of Education, an elite San Francisco law firm is 
engaging in the crudest form of discrimination—one that makes no 
distinctions amongst black people, that is totalizing, and that is akin to Jim 
Crow. It conflates “good” (nonstereotypical) and “bad” (stereotypical) 
blacks, discriminating against both. In this sense, even assimilationist 
blacks—blacks who work to shed (the negative social meanings of) their 
racial identities to fit in within particular institutional cultures—are 
vulnerable. 
Rhetorically, the Pro-Taneka Attorneys ask: Why would a major 
metropolitan law firm practice this form of discrimination? Given the legal 
community’s concern about the lack of racial and gender diversity at law 
firms—and especially at the partnership ranks—wasn’t it in the firm’s 
interest to promote Lauren? The Pro-Taneka Attorneys argue that it will be 
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difficult to convince a legal decisionmaker that Lauren’s case reflects 
discrimination. An easier (and more palatable) story for a judge or jury to 
accept is one based on the idea that Lauren just “fell through the cracks.”205 
After all, this happens all the time—and to people with strong performance 
records, and to white people as well. The Pro-Taneka Attorneys buttress 
this argument with the suggestion that a firm would have to be “racially 
schizophrenic” to embrace Lauren—and to integrate her into the firm—
without regard to, or notwithstanding her race, and subsequently deny her 
partnership because of it. 
Taneka, on the other hand, was not one of the boys. She did not fit in. 
In many ways, Taneka was an outsider. Through her manner, sartorial 
practices, accent, hairstyle, and name,206 Taneka reminded the firm that she 
was black—and not just descriptively (i.e., in terms of phenotype) but 
normatively (i.e., in terms of racial stereotypes). The Pro-Taneka Attorneys 
hypothesize that the firm denied Taneka promotion because they perceived 
her to be “flaunting” her racial identity—that is, to be “out of the closet” 
about her nonassimilationist racial identity. In short, Taneka’s behavior 
(even more than her phenotype) signified blackness. 
The Pro-Taneka Attorneys are optimistic that a legal decisionmaker 
could be persuaded that, given pervasive norms of nondiscrimination and 
colorblindness, it is unlikely that institutions will discriminate based solely 
on racial phenotype. Today, to the extent that an institution wants to 
discriminate, it will pay attention to the salience of its employees’ racial 
identity and not simply to the phenotypic “fact” of her race. Such an 
employer will make judgments about just how black, in a social or 
stereotypical sense, a phenotypically black employee appears to be. 
The Pro-Taneka Attorneys argue that, if an employee’s race is made 
salient by the choices the employee makes about (1) how to self-present 
within an institution or (2) whether to comply with the cultural norms of 
that institution, employers may conclude that the employee is overly 
committed to her race. According to these attorneys, an employer’s 
perception that an employee strongly identifies with being black activates 
negative racial stereotypes about what it means to be black. Their claim is 
that this happened to Taneka: The firm perceived her to be “really” black, 
that perception activated negative stereotypes and made the partners 
uncomfortable, the firm attributed those stereotypes to Taneka, and this 
attribution trumped Taneka’s job performance. 
 
205. For an analysis of one such story, see David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1924 (1999). See also Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 879-87 
(2002). 
206. See Alan B. Krueger, Sticks and Stones Can Break Bones, but the Wrong Name Can 
Make a Job Hard To Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at C2 (reporting results of a study 
purporting to show that “[a]pplicants with white-sounding names were 50 percent more likely to 
be called for interviews than were those with black-sounding names”). 
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C. The Assimilationist vs. the Difference Model 
The debate between the Pro-Lauren and Pro-Taneka Attorneys is a 
debate about assimilation and homogeneity, on the one hand, and difference 
and heterogeneity, on the other hand. The Assimilationist Model and the 
Difference Model conceptualize race differently and offer different answers 
to the question of whether employers should be permitted to use selection 
mechanisms to make intraracial distinctions. 
1. The Assimilationist Model 
The Assimilationist Model posits race as phenotype. Under this view, a 
person’s race is no more significant than the color of that person’s eyes. 
This understanding purports to be a descriptive account of what race is, but 
instead is a normative commitment about what race should be. 
The prototypical example of discrimination under the Assimilationist 
Model is one in which (1) two employees—one white and one nonwhite—
are similarly situated not only in terms of job performance but also in terms 
of institutional identity (i.e., how well they fit in or are assimilated into the 
workplace culture) and (2) the institution prefers the white employee. In 
such a scenario, a judge sees that, but for racial phenotype, the two 
employees are alike. That observation then becomes the basis for inferring 
that phenotypic difference caused the institution to prefer the white 
employee. The discrimination problem arises because, under the 
Assimilationist Model, that difference should not matter. People should not 
be judged by the color of their skin. 
a. Lauren’s Case 
Lauren’s case fits the Assimilationist Model. With respect to the 
schools she attended, her accent, her hair, her clothes, her social practices, 
and the committees on which she participated, Lauren was “just like” her 
white colleagues. Lauren did what she was supposed to do. She fit in. This 
notion of fit requires a nonwhite employee to send signals to the employer 
about the kind of nonwhite identity she will occupy as an employee. A 
judge examining Lauren’s case under the Assimilationist Model would 
conclude that Lauren provided that signal. She demonstrated that she was 
not a stereotypical black person. Through her workplace behavior and 
interactions, she established that she was unconventionally, and thus only 
phenotypically, black. Other than the color of her skin, there was no other 
way in which she was (based on prototypes of blackness) black. Since, 
under the Assimilationist Model, phenotypic blackness should be irrelevant 
to institutional decisionmaking, it was wrong for Lauren’s law firm to 
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discriminate against her. In effect, the Assimilationist Model rewards 
employees because of the distance they create between themselves and the 
black prototype. 
b. Taneka’s Case 
Taneka’s case does not fit the Assimilationist Model. Unlike with 
Lauren, it cannot be said that, but for phenotype, she was just like her white 
colleagues. Taneka was different, and her workplace behavior manifested 
this difference. Employing the Assimilationist Model, a judge might 
observe that, controlling for Taneka’s race (that is, her phenotype), there 
was a lot of difference between Taneka and her white colleagues, that they 
were not similarly situated, and that Taneka did not demonstrate a 
willingness to fit in. She never even tried. The judge could conclude that, to 
the extent that fit is a race-neutral criterion for promotion, it is a legitimate 
basis for an employment decision. 
2. The Difference Model 
The Difference Model centers on a performative conception of race, a 
conception that posits that race is signified not only through phenotype but 
also through performance—that is, behavior and self-presentation. Under 
this conception, a person’s intelligibility as a racial subject turns both on 
how she is racially marked (e.g., whether she is phenotypically white or 
black) and on how she performs or presents that racially marked identity 
(e.g., whether she wears a dashiki or a conventional suit to work). Both 
Lauren’s and Taneka’s cases can be challenged under this model, though 
for different reasons. 
a. Lauren’s Case 
The Difference Model’s argument that Lauren’s case reflects 
discrimination is not that, but for Lauren’s phenotype, she was similarly 
situated with respect to her white colleagues. Instead, the discrimination 
problem arises because the employer’s commitment to homogeneity creates 
an incentive for Lauren to demonstrate, among other thing, racial 
palatability. With respect to the promotion, Lauren has to demonstrate that 
her blackness will not threaten or undermine the homogeneity of the 
partnership, which presumably would be even more homogenized than the 
workplace more broadly.207 Lauren has to demonstrate that she will be 
 
207. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in 
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996). 
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different only in a phenotypic sense. If she fails to do so, she will not be 
hired or promoted. 
Even if Lauren is promoted, there is still, under the Difference Model, a 
discrimination problem. First, nonwhite racial identity performances 
engaged in to demonstrate racial palatability are hard work.208 Second, this 
work is directly linked to impermissible stereotyping; to the extent that 
nonwhites deploy identity performances, they do so to negate existing 
assumptions about their race. Third, because the decision to promote 
Lauren is based on evidence of racial palatability, it is a race-based 
decision. Thus, under the Difference Model, the discrimination problem 
does not disappear with Lauren’s promotion, as it would under the 
Assimilationist Model. There, the discrimination problem arises only if 
Lauren is not rewarded (i.e., promoted) for demonstrating her racial 
capacity to fit in. The Difference Model is also concerned with what 
employees have to do to, and with, their identities to be rewarded with 
promotion. 
b. Taneka’s Case 
Taneka’s case illustrates how the phenotypic conception of race that 
drives the Assimilationist Model is different from a performative 
conception of race that drives the Difference Model. As previously 
discussed, one way for an employee to demonstrate discrimination under 
the Difference Model would be to establish that, unlike her white 
colleagues, she felt pressured to demonstrate racial palatability. This 
problem is general and systemic: the employer’s use of selection 
mechanisms that place an additional burden on nonwhites to demonstrate 
that their nonwhite identity will not undermine workplace homogeneity. 
Another way an employee might demonstrate discrimination under the 
Difference Model resembles a standard disparate treatment claim. Here, the 
employee would have to establish: (1) nonwhite employee A is preferred 
over a nonwhite employee B, and (2) the basis for that preference is  
that nonwhite employee A is assimilationist (or unconventionally/ 
unstereotypically black—not a black prototype) and nonwhite employee B 
is nonassimilationist (or conventionally/stereotypically black—a black 
prototype). Under this scenario, a judge’s finding of discrimination could be 
based on the theory that by drawing a dichotomy between assimilationist 
and nonassimilationist blacks, the employer is regulating the terms under 
which black people may express their racial identity at work. 
 
208. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8, at 1263-76 (describing the types of costs 
associated with identity work, including opportunity costs, costs to dignity, and increased risk 
levels). 
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3. Implications: Choosing a Model 
The Assimilationist Model dominates antidiscrimination law. We have 
not located any race discrimination cases that use the Difference Model. 
Our construction of this model is based primarily on a set of recent Title 
VII cases at the intersection of gender and sexual orientation 
discrimination.209 For the most part, these cases (which we refer to 
collectively as the “gender performance cases”) involve either transsexuals 
or gay men. In each of the cases, the court’s finding of discrimination is 
based on the idea that it is impermissible for the employer to discriminate 
against male employees because the employer perceives them to be 
unstereotypical or unconventional men. The normative question is whether 
the approach reflected in these cases should be extended to racial 
discrimination claims. As a point of departure for thinking about this 
question, we identify the costs of both models. 
a. The Assimilationist Model: Choosing Lauren’s Case 
• Racial Skimming. To choose Lauren’s case is to construct a 
discrimination theory around the most-privileged members of 
outsider groups—those with the most economic and cultural 
capital. It is to engage in racial skimming. If we assume that 
antidiscrimination is meant to be progressive, protecting those 
most in need, this outcome is anomalous. The anomaly 
becomes more apparent if we think of law as correcting for a 
particular kind of market failure—racial preferences, which 
derive from what we have been calling the homogeneity 
incentive. Given this incentive, firms that feel pressured to 
engage in diversity hiring are likely to be interested in people 
like Lauren, not Taneka. This is not to say that Lauren is 
invulnerable to discrimination. The point instead is that her 
vulnerability, in a market structured by the norm of 
homogeneity, is decidedly less than Taneka’s. If the point of 
antidiscrimination law is to counter the market pressures for 
employers to discriminate, this argues against establishing an 
antidiscrimination regime in which people like Lauren function 
as prototypical plaintiffs. 
 
209. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 77, at 727 (discussing sexual orientation/gender cases 
that apply the difference model); see also Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging 
Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 87-88 (2002). On 
the predominance of the assimilationist model, see generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8; and 
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption, 108 YALE 
L.J. 485 (1998). 
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• Racial Cloning. There are normative reasons why one might 
not want the Assimilationist Model. The model creates 
incentives for people to assimilate away “difference.” It 
requires outsiders to be, like Lauren, homogenized. Understood 
in this way, the Assimilationist Model is a technology for 
cloning racially palatable outsiders.210 
• Racial Labor. The Assimilationist Model requires nonwhites to 
engage in a form of racial labor. It requires outsiders to work 
their identities to remove performative evidence of racial 
difference. Only phenotypic difference is allowed. In other 
words, nonwhites are not expected to change their skin color, 
only the racial content of their character.211 The labor of 
identity work is ongoing and becomes more burdensome as 
outsiders move up the professional ladder to more 
homogenized environments. 
b. The Costs of Difference: Choosing Taneka’s Case  
On the other side, choosing the Difference Model is not cost-free. 
• Inefficiencies. Inefficiencies result from restricting managers 
from pursuing homogeneity. The literature described in Part III 
suggests that these inefficiencies are real, even if they are only 
over the short-run.212 
• Racial Determination Problems. Problems of racial 
determinacy also caution against the Difference Model. Race as 
phenotype is easy for judges and juries to understand. Few 
people, for example, would quarrel with the idea that Michael 
Jordan is black. But what does it mean to say that a person has 
a salient black racial identity? How would we know? Is 
Michael Jordan “really” black, “really, really” black, or “not 
really” black at all? Do we want judges making these kinds of 
determinations? A performative conception of race presents 
racial determination problems that are not presented by a 
phenotypic conception of race.213 
 
210. See generally Essed & Goldberg, supra note 28. 
211. Cf. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990). 
212. One can argue that it is the homogeneity incentive that reduces efficiency because it cuts 
out real talent, skill, and experience. 
213. Of course, judges are already in the business of determining race. Our point is that these 
determinations are more complicated to the extent that they involve performative evidence. See 
Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century 
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• Race as Culture. Does a performative conception of race 
misconceive race as culture? Does it seek “to defend certain 
practices and expressions because they are subjectively 
important to an individual’s or a group’s sense of self?”214 And 
doesn’t this defense obscure the profound and consequential 
ways in which race operates structurally? 
• Authenticity. There is a danger that a performative 
understanding of race will entrench particular expressions of 
identity.215 These expressions can subsequently become 
“authentic” with the regulatory capacity to inauthenticate or 
“chill” other expressions. 
The foregoing suggests that the choice between the Assimilationist and 
Difference Models is difficult. But do we need to choose? Discrimination is 
not a monolithic experience and race is not a monolithic identity. In this 
sense, both Lauren and Taneka should have their day in court. Both can be 
harmed by selection mechanisms that screen for homogeneity. Both carry 
the burden (including stereotypes) of blackness. Their right to bring a 
discrimination claim should not necessarily turn on how they choose to 
negotiate that burden. 
VI. CONCLUSION: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION OF PROTOTYPES 
Our story is about the production and consumption of racial prototypes. 
The regulatory thrust of homogeneity creates both a demand for, and a 
supply of, specific racial prototypes—outsiders who can fit within 
predominantly white workplace cultures without “disturb[ing] the 
equilibrium of familiarity and sameness.”216 This Review began by 
suggesting that part of the reason this dynamic is obscured in CRT is 
because CRT has not paid attention to the interpersonal contexts—the 
 
South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); see also Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8; Tehranian, supra  
note 95.  
214. Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2000). For 
a useful critique of Ford’s essay, see Leti Volpp, Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1815 
(2000). For a more general discussion of the complex interplay between race and culture, see Leti 
Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1573 (1996). 
215. Ford, supra note 214, at 1805 (suggesting that “antiracism’s goal must be to dismantle 
the practices and institutions that continue to produce and to reinforce racial subordination—not to 
safeguard (and thereby fix) individuals or groups in their ascribed characteristics”). 
216. Essed & Goldberg, supra note 28, at 1072. Essed and Goldberg raise the question of 
whether conformity is a process by which group members demand from each other that no one 
disturb the equilibrium of familiarity and sameness. 
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micromarkets (e.g., employer/employee identity transactions)—in which 
race is produced. This Conclusion returns to the macro to make two points. 
The first links the micro discussion of prototype production in the 
workplace to the broader societal context; the second suggests some other 
areas of interest where the CRT/L&E approach might shed new light. 
First, the problem we have described is part of a larger problem that 
Philomena Essed and David Goldberg refer to as “cloning cultures,” which 
they define as the “broad social(ly manifest) dispositions to reproduce 
sameness.”217 They argue that “a critical account of systems of preference 
for sameness—from kinship to nation, from aesthetics to production and 
consuming—can be revealed as contributing to the reproduction of systems 
of social distinction and privilege.”218 Our aim has been to provide a 
concrete indication of how such a system manifests itself in the context of 
the workplace. 
But Essed and Golberg’s paper suggests that there is a more 
problematic implication of our project: the social manufacturing of racial 
palatability—one body at time. Put differently, our argument suggests that 
racial difference is being commodified and cloned in the workplace. 
Articulated thus, the homogeneity incentive operates as the driving force 
for a kind of cloning.219 Outsider performances of racial palatability are the 
raw materials from which homogenized outsider identities are 
manufactured. 
Yet there is an important difference between the cloning problem we 
identify and that upon which Essed and Goldberg focus. For the most part, 
Essed and Goldberg are concerned with “problematiz[ing] the systemic 
reproduction of white, masculine homogeneity in high status positions,”220 a 
reproduction that causes “exclusion along racial, ethnic, gender, sexual, 
class and other structural demarcations.”221 Their analysis does not account 
for the “diversity constraint”—that is, the need for institutions (and, 
presumably, the nation) to maintain some degree of difference. With the 
diversity constraint in mind, the cloning issue is no longer just about 
reproducing insiders. One has to think about the production and cloning of 
outsiders as well. Our Review focuses on the incentive for employers to 
create a market for, and to facilitate the cloning of, racially palatable 
outsiders. For institutional legitimacy and antidiscrimination reasons, the 
cloning market cannot produce, or transact in, only white clones. 
 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 1071. 
219. Id. at 1074 (“Fitting the group norm by displaying prototypical behaviour is at once a 
way of being accepted into a certain race, class, or community and a mechanism of cloning 
through culture.”). 
220. Id. at 1068. 
221. Id. at 1069. 
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Nor would employers want to do so. One reason why racial palatability 
is valued is that the racial bodies that produce it remain intelligible as 
nonwhite. To the extent that racial palatability takes the form of passing, it 
engenders white racial anxieties. To be valuable, the outsider prototype 
must be recognizable as a “copy.” It must not pass for, but only 
approximate, the “real.”222 
The second macro implication of our thesis relates to the general 
critique of prototypes. Here, we suggest that analysis of the microdynamics 
of workplace racial discrimination might be extended to analyze other 
problems. In this context, one can think of a prototype as a mental shortcut 
to categorize unfamiliar situations.223 We all have images in our minds as to 
prototypical rape victims, sexual harassers, welfare recipients, and so on.224 
To the extent that actors in the legal system use these prototypes to decide 
cases—for example, prosecutors or juries deciding whether a rape occurred 
by looking to see whether the victim fit the prototypical image of a rape 
victim, as opposed to asking whether the facts satisfied the elements of the 
crime—this can cause systemic errors.225 
Consider, for example, Martha Chamallas’s critique of the rape 
prototype. Chamallas explains that, with rape, the prototype is stranger 
rape, where the perpetrator is often a black male and the victim a white 
woman.226 Most rapes, however, occur between acquaintances, between 
 
222. Judith Butler makes a similar point about homo- and heterosexuality. Judith Butler, 
Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE-OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13 
(Diana Fuss ed., 1991). Essed and Goldberg’s notion of productivism includes the possibility that 
consumers of prototypes will not often be able to differentiate the real from the imitation. Essed & 
Goldberg, supra note 28, at 1075. In the racial market we are describing, this discernment is 
crucial. 
223. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES 
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of 
Offenses in a Revised Model Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 301 (2000); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal 
Concepts, 61 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991). 
224. See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN 125-35 
(2000); Chamallas, supra note 26; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing 
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686 (1998); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: 
Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 416 
(1996); Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of “Hate,” 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 804 (1999). 
225. In social cognition theory, this tendency to attribute behavior to character and not 
situations is referred to as the “fundamental attribution error.” See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. 
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 67-72 (2d ed. 1991); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and 
Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 369-70 (Daniel T. Gilbert et 
al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). Critical theorists such as Duncan Kennedy often discuss prototypes as 
“narratives” or “scripts,” where a code in the script explains why the actor behaved in a particular 
manner, and the complexity of the actor’s motivations is eclipsed by the simplified cultural code. 
See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 781-82; see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 133 
(1993). 
226. For this example, we draw on Chamallas, supra note 26, at 783-86, and the materials 
cited therein. 
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people of the same race and class, and on dates.227 Reasoning from 
prototypes, therefore, presents the danger that most rapes will go 
unpunished because they do not fit the prototype.228 Further, rapes by black 
men of white women will be disproportionately punished, whereas rapes by 
black men and white men of black women will receive less punishment.229 
Leti Volpp makes a similar point about domestic abuse—more 
particularly, battered woman syndrome. She argues that this syndrome is 
based on a “‘model’ battered woman,” in other words, a prototype: a 
woman who is “passive and helpless.”230 Volpp demonstrates the extent to 
which judges refuse to give a battered women’s instruction in cases in 
which they perceive that the domestic abuse victim is not a model battered 
woman. She concludes that because “battered women’s syndrome 
exemplifies a stereotype of passive married middle-class white women, it 
may be especially difficult for battered women of color and gay men and 
lesbians to fit the model.”231 
An L&E-oriented approach to prototypes could elaborate upon 
Chamallas’s and Volpp’s critique by asking two questions. (1) How do 
prototypes incentivize behavior? And (2) what are the costs of responding 
to the incentives that prototypes create? If the protection of rape laws 
accrues only when women behave in a particular manner (let us say, 
“modestly”), that means that women who want the protection of the rape 
laws have an incentive to present themselves in ways that fit the protected 
prototype. In this sense, the price of receiving legal protection is the cost of 
acting in a manner that fits the prototype. These costs may be higher for 
some than others. For example, if modesty is defined in terms of white 
upper-class behavior, it may be costly and difficult (even if not wholly 
impossible) for minority women to perform their identity in a manner that 
fits that prototype.232 Further, quite apart from shaping how women perform 
their identities in the real world of social interactions, the existence of 
prototypes shapes how women present themselves at trials. To access 
battered woman’s syndrome, for example, there is an incentive for women 
to highlight their passivity and lack of agency. On the other side, from the 
usually ignored perpetrator’s perspective, there is an incentive to attack 
 
227. Id. at 783 n.132. 
228. Id. at 783-84. 
229. Id. at 784-85 & nn.135-36. 
230. Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 92 (1994). Importantly, Volpp’s concern is not just with battered 
woman syndrome, but with prototypes created for cultural defenses as well.  
231. Id. at 92-93. 
232. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 175 (1981) (“One of racism’s salient 
historical features has always been the assumption that white men—especially those who wield 
economic power—possess an incontestable right of access to Black women’s bodies.”). 
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women who do not fit the prototype. This is part of what explains black 
women’s historical vulnerability to rape. 
Chamallas’s and Volpp’s papers are part of a larger critical literature 
that demonstrates the problems of prototypes. What remains to be 
considered is the regulatory and productive effects these legal prototypes 
have on the identities in question. For whether the prototype in question 
implicates sexual harassment, hate speech, rape, or welfare law, identity is 
being cloned. Heretofore, critical race theorists have not seriously engaged 
this productive capacity of law. 
* * * 
This project was a product of our conversations with the late David 
Charny—conversations that began as early as our first year in law school. 
Without David’s support, encouragement, and inspiration, we probably 
would not have become legal academics. His passion for ideas, particularly 
those ideas that were related to social change, was infectious. And his 
generosity and willingness to talk to students was unbounded. 
This project was little more than a glint in David’s eye when he died. 
We do not presume that it lives up to his standards. Nor do we know 
whether it lives up to what he would have expected of us. What we do 
know is that he wanted us to perform this collaboration and that his spirit is 
reflected in it. We confess though, that we did not always believe that this 
project was possible, or even worth trying. We argued as much to David. 
We had likely internalized the caricatures with which we began our 
Review. Yet, here we are—one sentence from the end and grateful, once 
again to David, that he sent us on this journey. We will continue to miss 
David, and his memory will continue to shape us. 
